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INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday, May 20, 2008, the National Football League (the
“NFL” or the “League”) officially notified the National Football
League Players’ Association (the “NFLPA,” the “Players’
Association” or the “Union”) that ownership (the “Owners” or
“Ownership”) had elected to opt out of the parties’ current
collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA” or the “Agreement”).1
This decision threatens nearly two decades of uninterrupted labor
peace and mutual financial gains. In 2006, Owners capitulated to
Union demands, as they hastily ratified the CBA during an
emergency meeting in the interest of maintaining steadily climbing
League revenues.2 This action by Owners was intended to avoid a
work stoppage, which would have derailed the continuing
economic success professional football had enjoyed. The chief
concession was to allocate an additional percentage of League
revenues to player salaries,3 which under the 2006 CBA now

1

John Clayton, NFL Owners Vote Unanimously to Opt Out of Labor Deal,
ESPN.COM, May 20, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3404596.
2
Vito Stellino, NFL Confidential: Goodell’s Hands Full with Heavy Contract Issues,
FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 13, 2006, http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/081306
/jag_4408901.shtml (noting that “labor peace was more important than having a labor
strike or Armageddon” (quoting Jacksonville Jaguars owner, Wayne Weaver)).
3
Id.
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approached 60% of League gross revenues. In signing the
agreement, Ownership seemed more concerned with preserving
labor peace than considering the long-term consequences of the
future.
As the situation stands today, skyrocketing player salaries and
a severe recession have drastically altered Ownership’s opinion of
the CBA. Despite league-wide revenues approaching a healthy $9
billion,4 Ownership has taken the position that the 2006 CBA
allocated too high a percentage of revenues to players and now
threatens the NFL’s economic viability.5 Said one owner, “[i]t’s a
bad deal. A lot of people realize that now.”6
The NFLPA expected Ownership to opt out of the CBA in
2008.7 Now, the Union is unifying its front after the passing of the
Players’ Association’s longtime and seminal Executive Director,
Gene Upshaw.
Shortly before passing, Mr. Upshaw had
commented on the League’s rationale for opting out, saying “[j]ust
because the owners did not make as much as they wanted, they feel
they lost money. We are not going to retreat [from a higher
allocation of revenues] and we are not going to take less.”8
When the NFL opted out, Commissioner Roger Goodell sent
Upshaw an email providing three reasons why the League had
exercised its option to reopen the contract for negotiation. Goodell
pointed to (1) high labor costs (an unacceptable percentage of
League revenues being allocated to paying player salaries); (2)
problems with NFL rookie salaries (exorbitant contracts to
unproven players); and (3) the legal inability of franchises to
recoup signing bonuses from players who breach contracts or
refuse to perform (including issues with player discipline).9
Commissioner Goodell also stated in separate comments that it is
4
Mark Maske, Owners May Revisit NFL Labor Issues, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/18/AR2008031802
995.html.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Clayton, supra note 1.
8
Gene Upshaw, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Panel Address at
the Sports Lawyers Conference (May 2008).
9
Ron Borges, Vrabel: There’s a Place for More Pay, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 9, 2008,
http://www.bostonherald.com/sports/football/patriots/view.bg?articleid=1131071.
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“very clear . . . that the [O]wnership doesn’t believe that this deal
is working.”10 While the NFL was not suffering undue financial
hardship, Ownership recognized that player salaries needed to be
curbed.11 Thus, opting out of the 2006 CBA and bargaining to sign
a more favorable accord became the League’s new cost
containment strategy.
In response, the NFLPA sought to determine the value of NFL
franchises to gauge the Owners’ profits.
The NFLPA
commissioned a study that found “the average value of an NFL
franchise in the last [ten] years has risen from $288 [million] to
$1.04 [billion], increasing at a compound annual rate of 13.7%.”12
The League questioned the accuracy of this study, considering the
only franchise data was from the Green Bay Packers, who are the
League’s only publicly owned franchise.13 As illustrated, both
sides have a sharply contrasting picture about the financial
viability of the NFL; one should expect a long, protracted and
contentious labor dispute if a new CBA is not in place before the
completion of the 2010 season.14
10

Mark Maske, NFL Owners Want New Deal, WASH. POST, May 21, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/20m08/05/20/AR200805200
1693.html.
11
See id. In his statement to the press, Goodell chose his words carefully, as such
wording is important when discussing finances and an employer’s ability to pay. Id.
12
NFLPA Addresses Stagnent CBA Negotiations with NFL Owners, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/
127349; see also KEVIN M. MURPHY & ROBERT H. TOPEL, THE ECONOMICS OF NFL TEAM
OWNERSHIP 8–9 (2009), available at http://www.rodneyfort.com/PHSportsEcon/
Common/LinksandFun/LinksFun04/FINAL%20-%20The%20Economics%20of%20
NFL%20Team%20Ownership.pdf.
13
Forbes recently estimated that the Saint Louis Rams franchise was valued at $931
million, twenty-fifth out of the thirty-one NFL teams. Michael K. Ozanian, Rams Rushing
Toward New Ownership?, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2009, http://blogs.forbes.com/sportsmoney
blog/2009/10/rams-rushing-toward-new-ownership/.
14
Attempts to publically address the growing labor conflict have turned contentious.
Rhetoric between the parties seems to be escalating and both sides have even taken to
social media to argue specifically about disclosure of financial information. See, e.g.,
Profile of Greg Aiello, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/gregaiello (last visited Dec. 28, 2009)
(League spokesman); Profile of George Atallah, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/GAtallah
(last visited Dec. 28, 2009) (NFLPA spokesperson); see also Sean Leahy, NFL, NFLPA
Spokesmen Trade ‘Fun Facts’ About CBA on Twitter, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2009,
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2009/10/nfl-nflpa-spokesmentrade-fun-facts-about-cba-on-twitter/1?csp=34.
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Both labor and management are making personnel-related and
financial preparations for a protracted labor dispute. One move
that increases the likelihood of a prolonged labor dispute is the
NFL’s decision to hire veteran labor attorney Bob Batterman.
Batterman, as National Hockey League (the “NHL”) outside
counsel, was intimately involved with planning the NHL’s strategy
in its labor dispute with the National Hockey League Players
Association (the “NHLPA”).15 During this work stoppage, the
NHL locked players out to achieve this “cost certainty.”16 This
directly translated into cutting player salaries and installing a “hard
salary cap.”17 The NHL ultimately sacrificed a full season of
hockey to achieve cost certainty. However, it is unclear whether
this lost year was in the best interest of hockey. The NFL may be
using Batterman’s NHL labor strategy as a blueprint for its own
approach to dealing with the Union. The question remains whether
this same strategy, when employed against a more powerful union
like the NFLPA, will achieve a result that is in the best interest of
professional football.
With the addition of Batterman, it is unclear whether the NFL
will implement a similar hard-line strategy utilized by the NHL or
whether the parties will strike a more reconciliatory tone.
However, considering the parties’ bargaining history is important
when evaluating the NFL’s bargaining strategy.18 This Comment
examines the material issues and likely arguments regarding the

15

“‘Batterman bullied [the union] into submission,’ says one sports labor lawyer who
requested anonymity. ‘If one accepts the conspiracy theory of collective bargaining, this
means the NFL must be looking for trouble,’ says another.” See Brian Baxter,
Proskauer’s Bob Batterman Signals a Labor War in the NFL, AMLAW DAILY (May 21,
2008),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/05/smashmouth----p.html
(alteration in original).
16
See Joshua Liebman, Tip Your “Cap” to the Players: 2007–2008 Off-Season
Reveals NHL’s Salary Cap Benefits on Players, 16 SPORTS LAW. J. 81, 92 (2009)
(mentioning “cost certainty” via potentially implementing a salary cap linked to league
revenues); see also Roger I. Abrams, Sports Law Issues Just over the Horizon, 3 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 49, 61 (2003) (describing Commissioner Bettman having a steadfast
adherence to the goal of “cost certainty” in discussing the NHL inevitable conflict with
the NHLPA).
17
A “hard salary cap” prohibits teams from having payrolls in excess of a mandated
number. If a team goes over the salary cap, it is penalized.
18
The parties’ history is full of strikes and lockouts. See infra Part II.
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looming NFL-NFLPA labor stoppage in 2011. Part I recounts the
origins of the NFL as well as the recent events that were material
in leading to this labor dispute. Part II examines the origins of the
NFLPA. As it is a labor stoppage that Mr. Batterman oversaw,19
Part III recounts the NHL’s 2004 lockout. Part IV summarizes and
explores the major concepts of labor law, most principally the
theory of good faith bargaining. Part V provides a brief statement
of the case, discusses the issues germane to this labor dispute, and
presents arguments for both the NFL and the Union. Part VI
briefly discusses how an antitrust lawsuit recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court may impact the positions of the
parties. Finally, Part VII provides several predictions and a
conclusion to this Comment.
This Comment recounts the origins of both the NFL and the
PA, providing great detail into the bargaining process between the
two entities from 1950 until 1993. This level of detail is necessary
because the most effective method to determine a party’s sincerity
in good faith bargaining, which is a paramount concept in labor
law,20 is to keep in context the bargaining history of the parties.
This history may influence the level of contentiousness amongst
the parties and their sincerity to reach an agreement.
I. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
A. NFL Origins
A league with humble beginnings, the National Football
League was born in an Ohio automobile showroom in 1920.21 The
NFL enjoyed a period of modest growth while trying to find its
way onto solid financial ground after being resurrected from the

19

The NFL may also be basing its strategy in a similar vein as the NHL, who
attributed the year of lost hockey to the sport’s dire need to achieve “cost certainty.”
Thus, it may be foreseeable that the NFL, by bringing in Batterman, is seeking to use the
NHL’s strategy as a blueprint for management’s handling of this upcoming labor
stoppage.
20
See infra text accompanying note 246.
21
DAVID HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NFL 12 (Bantam Books
1986).
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defunct “American Professional Football Association.”22 The
League found its footing under Commissioner Bert Bell’s sturdy
leadership.23 He implemented measures such as the rookie player
draft24 and recognized the power of televising games.25 However,
professional football truly began to make strides with the rise of
Commissioner Pete Rozelle. The legendary commissioner’s
leadership was instrumental in convincing team executives to make
decisions that promoted the best interests of the League.26 This
thinking led to major results such as harnessing the power of
television for the benefit of the entire NFL.27
Rozelle convinced owners in large markets, such as New York
Giants owner Wellington Mara, to forego lucrative local television
contracts in favor of a deal that equally benefited every franchise.28
Owners embraced Rozelle’s “league think” ideology29 to pool
individual team television broadcasting rights and leverage them
into several large contracts. One deal was signed with CBS; the
other with NBC. Over time, broadcasting contracts provided the
financial security member franchises desperately sought.30 More
importantly, these contracts served as a foundation to allow the
NFL to find economic and competitive parity amongst its clubs.31

22

MARK YOST, TAILGATING, SACKS AND SALARY CAPS: HOW THE NFL BECAME THE
MOST SUCCESSFUL SPORTS LEAGUE IN HISTORY 53 (Kaplan Publishing 2006).
23
See Biography: Bert Bell, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, http://www.profootball
hof.com/hof/member.aspx? PLAYER_ID=23 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
24
YOST, supra note 22, at 55.
25
Although Bert Bell was the first commissioner to put NFL games on television,
Alvin “Pete” Rozelle would be the first commissioner in sports to fully utilize the power
of television. See id. at 63.
26
“Rozelle surmised that the NFL’s future depended on every NFL owner—from the
wealthiest and most profitable to the neediest and most owing—perceiving his or her
equity stake as vitally interconnected, with one team’s economic failures threatening all
others.” See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape
Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 731–32 (2010) (citing a New York Times article by David
Harris detailing how “Rozelle persuaded his employers that the key to marketing the
NFL’s product was maintaining a consistently high level of competition among all the
clubs”).
27
The first NFL television broadcast occurred in 1939.
28
This occurred in 1962.
29
HARRIS, supra note 21, at 13.
30
YOST, supra note 22, at 63–64.
31
Id.
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The NFL faced continuous competition from rival leagues
because of its financial success.32 While it faced competition from
multiple upstart leagues, the greatest challenge came from the
American Football League (the “AFL”). The AFL was founded in
1959 after charter owner Lamar Hunt was denied an NFL
franchise.33 It was Hunt’s AFL that demonstrated the potential
value of pooling a league’s collective broadcast rights, as he built
the AFL around its national television contract with ABC.34 The
NFL was unsuccessful in its effort to weaken the AFL, so the NFL
took a different route. After a series of secret meetings between
the two rival leagues35 that required receiving congressional
approval for the action,36 the AFL merged into the NFL. This new
NFL now boasted a twenty-four-member league and would expand
up to thirty member teams soon thereafter.37 Thus, the NFL was
poised to take on baseball for supremacy amongst the American
sports consumer.
B. Modern NFL and Issues
The NFL continued its success after Rozelle retired in 1989.
Paul Tagliabue succeeded Rozelle as commissioner and
implemented a strategy to increase League revenues through
stadium construction.38 During his term, Tagliabue oversaw an
ambitious League initiative of stadium construction and
refurbishment and also presided over almost two decades of
uninterrupted labor peace between the NFL and NFLPA. While

32

Competitors include The All-American Football Conference (the “AAFC”), 1946–
49; The American Football League (the “AFL”), 1960–69; The World Football League
(the “WFL”), 1974–75; The United States Football League (the “USFL”), 1983–86; The
Canadian Football League (the “CFL”), as it had a brief presence in the United States,
(1993–95); The Extreme Football League (the “XFL”), 2000–01; and The Arena Football
League (the “AFL”), 1987–present.
33
Matthew Levine, Despite His Antics, T.O. Has a Valid Point: Why NFL Players
Deserve a Bigger Piece of the Pie, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 425, 431 (2006).
34
YOST, supra note 22, at 73.
35
See NFL History by Decade, 1961–1970, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/history/
chronology/1961-1970 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010) [hereinafter NFL History by Decade].
36
HARRIS, supra note 21, at 17.
37
NFL History by Decade, supra note 35.
38
At the League’s 1994 winter meetings, Tagliabue urged owners to focus on stadiums
as a high priority. YOST, supra note 22, at 190–91.
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these two accomplishments did much to cement a positive legacy
for Tagliabue, he is also increasingly being blamed by Ownership
for the NFL’s agreeing to the 2006 CBA.39 It was Tagliabue who
urged Ownership to sign a CBA that seemingly mortgaged the
NFL’s future in order to allow the commissioner to retire from his
position without incident.40 This forced Tagliabue’s successor,
Roger Goodell, to handle the uncertainties of the future.
C. Negotiating the 2006 CBA
During the 2006 negotiations, Owners seemingly believed that
preserving lasting labor peace was too immense to jeopardize with
a potential labor stoppage. Not wanting his legacy tarnished by
retiring just as labor unrest was developing, Tagliabue lobbied
Ownership to accept the deal. The Agreement was negotiated
within a matter of weeks, culminating in an eleventh-hour
deliberation and decision by Ownership to accept the Union’s
proposal.41 At the time of the agreement, Rozelle’s “league think”
ideology seemed to be back in place. Both labor and management
seemingly acted in the best interests of the game by preserving
labor peace and the massive financial revenues that are now a
staple of professional football.42 However, even at this time where
both parties’ interests seemed aligned, the CBA failed to address
several areas of concern for the League: high player salaries and
escalating rookie salary structures. In fact, the CBA was modified
to allocate more revenue for player salaries.43

39

See Thomas George, Owner’s Meetings Could Foreshadow Labor Strife, NFL.COM,
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80772c56&template=with-video&confirm
=true (last visited Sept. 2, 2010).
40
Id.
41
The proposal was approved by Ownership 30–2 (the Bills and Bengals dissented).
Jarrett Bell, NFL Owners Accept Player Union Proposal with 30–2 Vote, USA TODAY,
Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2006-03-08-labor_x.htm.
42
“This agreement is not about one side winning or losing,” said Executive Director
Upshaw in a statement. “Ultimately, it is about what is best for the players, the owners
and the fans of the National Football League.” See NFL Owners Approve Six-Year CBA
Extension, ESPN.COM, Mar. 9, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id
=2360258 [hereinafter NFL Owners Approve].
43
See Chris Deubert & Glen M. Wong, Understanding the Evolution of Signing
Bonuses and Guaranteed Money in the National Football League: Preparing for the
2011 Collective Bargaining Negotiations, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 179, 181–82 (2009).
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Some Owners were dissatisfied with the 2006 CBA even
though it ensured short-term labor peace. Buffalo Bills owner
Ralph Wilson questioned whether management acted too hastily
without carefully deliberating its future economic consequences.
Wilson felt that Ownership lacked a clear grasp on several issues
covered in the proposed CBA.44 It was especially unclear how the
new CBA was going to solve the revenue sharing disparity
amongst clubs. “I didn’t understand [the revenue sharing sections
of the 2006 CBA] . . . it is a very complicated issue and I didn’t
believe we should [have] rush[ed] to vote in [forty-five]
minutes,”45 said Wilson. League competitive balance depends on a
successful revenue sharing policy.46 Small market teams such as
Buffalo and Indianapolis depend on shared revenue to maintain
financial viability, an essential element to preserve the competitive
balance of the League.47
Despite objections, both sides generally thought that the 2006
CBA adequately addressed the increasing revenue disparity
between clubs due to a variety of its provisions. Under the
agreement, the top fifteen revenue-producing teams pledged to
contribute about $900 million to a shared pool over the life of the
CBA.48 Those funds would then be equally distributed to lower
revenue-generating franchises per the CBA.49 The new deal also
increased the revenue sharing pool from $40 million to
approximately $100 million annually.50
One omission from the 2006 CBA was that this revenue
sharing provision did not adequately address the millions of
unshared dollars in revenue streams derived by savvy owners
through creative use of team stadiums. When the 1993 CBA was
44

See NFL Owners Approve, supra note 42.
Id.
46
George, supra note 39.
47
Deubert & Wong, supra note 43, at 182.
48
See Don Pierson, There’s Peace on Turf in NFL; 6-Year Accord Raises Salary Cap,
Revenue Sharing, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 2006, at C1.
49
Each one of the NFL’s top fifteen top revenue producing-teams was required to give
even more money to less financially stable owners in addition to sharing revenue with the
NFLPA. See id.
50
See Mark Maske, NFL Appears Headed Toward a Season Without a Cap, WASH.
POST, Dec. 30, 2009, at D3 [hereinafter Maske, NFL Appears].
45
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signed, stadiums generated almost no revenues,51 and thus, there
was no need to include stadium revenues into the CBA as shared
revenue. However, stadium revenues now account for about 20%
of league-wide revenue.52 Savvy NFL owners leverage the namerecognition power of their franchises by creating additional
revenue streams through new or refurbished stadia. However,
these new streams,53 along with increasingly more creative
sponsorship methods, are contra to the core NFL league think
ideology.54 An uneven increase in unshared team revenues
threatens the competitive balance and viability of the League. Any
injury to the League is also felt by its chief employees: the players.
II. THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION
A. From Clean Uniforms to a Piece of the Pie
The National Football League Players Association began in
earnest in 1956.55 Members of the Green Bay Packers and
Cleveland Browns were in search of a few simple guarantees from
management, such as clean uniforms and payment of salaries to
injured players.56 Players eventually enlisted the assistance of
attorney Creighton Miller, a former NFL player and team general
manager.57 Players throughout the NFL signed authorization cards

51

In the early 1990s, an average NFL team’s stadium revenues were roughly 10% of
its total revenue. YOST, supra note 22, at 6.
52
Id.
53
Revenue streams may include premium club seating, luxury suites, stadium clubs,
and personal seat licenses. Personal seat licenses, or PSLs, are a one-time fee that fans
pay in exchange for the privilege to buy a season ticket. Id. at 6.
54
As one NFL owner contended, unshared revenues generated by new or refurbished
stadia provide teams with “an extra pool of cash that could be used to compensate players
above, beyond, and ‘around’ the salary cap limitations.” Id. at 10–11 (presenting the
small market prospective in the unshared revenue debate).
55
History, The Beginning—1956, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflplayers.
com/About-us/History (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
56
History of the NFLPA, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflplayers.com/
About-us/History (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter NFLPA History]. Additionally,
players demanded a minimum salary and that management pay for players’ equipment.
Id.
57
Id.
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and, by November 1956, Miller became their leader.58 This effort
led to the creation of the NFLPA, which represented National
Football League players in their collective bargaining efforts.59
Ownership initially balked at the Players’ Association’s
attempts at collective bargaining. Players, fearful of owner reprisal
due to frowned-upon union involvement, held secret meetings to
plan a strike.60 Fear of owner reprisal was justified; one owner
stated to his team members that if they struck, he would simply
play the game without them.61 The players quickly capitulated,
realizing that negotiating leverage was squarely with
management.62
Player mobility was a cardinal issue long before any football
union was formed. Since no leverage existed to bargain, players
opted to litigate the issue. The first notable player lawsuit was Bill
Radovich’s 1957 challenge under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The
Detroit Lions nose guard claimed that the NFL’s refusal to allow
his request to move from Detroit to California to be near an ill
family member was a restraint of trade.63 The NFL argued that the
League was immune from an antitrust challenge, citing the
Supreme Court’s exemption of Major League Baseball from the
Sherman Act.64 The Supreme Court instead sided with Radovich,
holding that football did not have the same antitrust exemption that
Major League Baseball enjoyed.65 This favorable ruling gave the
Players’ Association an important victory that the Union could use
as leverage in negotiations with Ownership. Although Radovich
was a significant victory, the Players’ Association failed to take
advantage by challenging other fundamental NFL concepts.66
58

Id.
Id.
60
ROBERT C. BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 124 (Auburn
House Publishing Co. 1986).
61
Id. The individual threatening reprisal was Washington Redskins’ owner, George
Preston Marshall. Id.
62
Id.
63
Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 447–48 (1957).
64
Id. at 449–50.
65
See id. at 451–54; see also McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197 (6th
Cir. 1979) (finding that the NHL’s reserve system was subject to antitrust scrutiny).
66
MICHAEL ORIARD, BRAND NFL: MAKING AND SELLING AMERICA’S FAVORITE SPORTS
57 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2007).
59
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The next decade brought a new challenge to League owners as
they were forced to deal with the upstart American Football
League. After these leagues merged in 1966, player solidarity
became a significant issue of concern for the Union.67 NFL player
representatives faced the task of representing all members that had
merged into the League.
The Players’ Association only
represented sixteen of the twenty-six team rosters in the League at
this point.68 The players sought guidance from the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (the
“AFL-CIO”) to assist in forming a labor union of professional
athletes.69 The AFL-CIO was not interested, and neither was
Creighton Miller.70 As a result, the players voted to remain an
association instead of a union. The NFL responded by refusing to
negotiate with the players.71 Knowing the Players’ Association
was weak, in 1968, Ownership locked out the players.72 The
weeklong labor stoppage resulted in the first-ever NFL-NFLPA
CBA.73 But the lack of player solidarity contributed to less-thanhoped-for results.74

67

Id. at 58.
The 1960’s—AFL/NFL Competition, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nfl
players.com/About-us/History (last visited Dec. 29, 2009) [hereinafter NFLPA in the
1960s].
69
NFLPA History, supra note 56.
70
Id. The players also rejected overtures from the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters to organize. ORIARD, supra note 66, at 58.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
The CBA embodied less than the teams had hoped for, as player-representatives
accepted Ownership’s terms without first consulting the Association. NFLPA in the
1960s, supra note 68.
The agreement called for far less than the NFLPA had hoped to
achieve. Included in the demands were minimum salaries of $15,000
for rookies and $20,000 for veterans, exhibition game pay of $500
per game, lowering retirement age to 45, and impartial grievance
arbitration. But, under the contract eventually agreed to, minimum
salary remained at $9,000 for rookies and $10,000 for veterans,
exhibition game pay stayed at $50 per game, the commissioner
remained as the arbitrator, and retirement age stayed at 65.
Id.
68
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B. A Cat and Mouse Game—Negotiations Between the NFL and
NFLPA
Players took a significant step toward achieving cohesiveness
by consolidating the NFL and AFL Players Associations into one
Players’ Association in 1970.75 While both NFL and AFL loyalists
pushed for their respective union leaders to be the Union’s firstever president, Baltimore Colts tight end John Mackey was
eventually selected.76
With its new leader, the Players’
Association was ready to engage Ownership in a new round of
negotiations.
Ownership seemed receptive to recognize and meet with the
Players’ Association. However, recognition was based on several
conditions including a promise to eliminate lawyers from being
present during meetings and that there would be no attempts by the
Players’ Association to negotiate increases in pre-season pay.77 A
meeting was arranged in which two representatives from each side
would be present. But when the two reps for the Players’
Association arrived, they were greeted by an Ownership delegation
comprised of nine individuals.78 Before the meeting started,
Mackey was advised by his counsel to sign a contract that
Ownership had provided.79 This document included a provision
that would have bound the players to Ownership’s only offer “in
perpetuity.”80 Instead of signing the document, Mackey fired his
attorney and hired the law firm of Lindquist & Vennum.81 A
young attorney by the name of Ed Garvey was assigned as counsel;
shortly thereafter he left the firm and became the Players’
Association’s first-ever Executive Director.82
Garvey was charged with an arduous job as the first ever NFLCBA expired in January 1970. Negotiations led to a three-day
75
The 1970’s—AFL and NFL Players Association Merge, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N,
http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Dec. 29, 2009) [hereinafter
NFLPA in the 1970s].
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
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players’ strike, and Ownership retaliated with a seventeen-day
lockout.83
Eventually, Garvey secured $19.1 million in
concessions by Ownership, which mostly came in the form of
player pension contributions.84 Under Garvey’s direction, the
NFLPA started bargaining for concessions that it arguably already
should have based on the Radovich decision in 1957. These
bargaining issues included (1) the elimination of the amateur draft,
(2) the elimination of the options clause, (3) the Rozelle Rule, (4)
impartial arbitration of all disputes, (5) individual contracts to
protect players, and (6) elimination of the waiver system.85 Under
the Rozelle Rule, a player could change teams at the conclusion of
his contract provided the new team compensated the old club for
the loss of that player’s services.86 Compensation was provided to
teams in the form of players, money, or draft picks.87 If teams
failed to reach an agreement, Commissioner Rozelle was able to
determine and award compensation.88 While players could
negotiate with any team after their contract expired, the rule still
significantly restrained player movement.
In 1974, the Players’ Association levied sixty-three “freedom
issues” upon the Owners, including a demand for the elimination
of the Rozelle Rule.89 Owners feared that such a free agency
system would ruin the League’s competitive balance, thereby
destroying the very foundation that the League’s success was
based upon.90 Thus, each side had drawn their lines of contention.
Ownership attempted to send a message to the Union by only
inviting rookies and free agents to NFL training camps.91 The
NFLPA tried to hold its line with pickets, but solidarity was still
83

BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 125.
Id.
85
Id.
86
C. Peter Goplerud III, Collective Bargaining in the National Football League: A
Historical and Comparative Analysis, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 16 (1997).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
ORIARD, supra note 66, at 61. The mantra amongst the rank-and-file players became
“no freedom, no football.” NFLPA in the 1970s, supra note 75.
90
According to Rozelle, if players were “given total freedom to negotiate their
services, the [L]eague would be dominated by a few rich teams and would eventually
lose both fan interest and revenue.” Goplerud, supra note 86, at 16.
91
BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 126.
84
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weak.92 After one month, more than one-quarter of all players had
crossed lines. The strike ended after forty-four days,93 leaving the
Union “badly split and seriously underfunded.”94 Ownership
punished players who were significantly involved with the strike,
illustrating that there would be consequences for individuals who
involved themselves with the Players’ Association.95
The NFLPA responded by filing unfair labor practice charges
with the National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB” or the
“Board”).96 The NLRB Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”)
ordered reinstatement of the players.97 After another failed strike
attempt in 1975, it became apparent that Garvey’s Union was still
weak. Many players lacked the willingness to unite as a viable
union. Instead of negotiating, the Union again found redress
through the court.98 Mackey and thirty-five other players filed suit
against the League in Minnesota Federal District Court, claiming
that the Rozelle Rule violated antitrust laws as a restraint on
trade.99 The district court ruled in the Union’s favor, finding that
the Rozelle Rule was a per se violation of the Sherman Act in the
form of a group boycott.100 Upon appeal, the League asserted that
the nonstatutory labor exemption101 precluded players from
92

Id.
Id.
94
Goplerud, supra note 86, at 16.
95
Three Union leaders, Bill Curry, Kermit Alexander, and Tom Keating, were either
cut or traded by their respective NFL clubs during the 1974 strike as a consequence of
their Players’ Association activities. BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 126.
96
Id.
97
Id. Sports law commentators viewed ALJ involvement as a symptom of the Union’s
poor negotiating leverage with the NFL. Id.
98
See Goplerud, supra note 86, at 17 (stating that using antitrust law was “necessary
because of the failure of the bargaining process and the strike to effectively represent the
players’ interests, thus leaving antitrust laws as the only vehicle for challenging the
owners’ actions”).
99
Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Minn. 1975), rev’d
on other grounds, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
100
Id. at 1007.
101
The nonstatutory labor exemption is a mechanism preventing antitrust scrutiny that
survives the “expiration of a collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach an
impasse as to that issue; thereafter, the term or condition is no longer immune from
scrutiny under the antitrust laws, and the employer runs the risk that continued imposition
of the condition will subject the employer to liability.” Powell v. Nat’l Football League,
678 F. Supp. 777, 788 (D. Minn. 1988) [hereinafter Powell I], rev’d, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th
93
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challenging this rule because players had collectively bargained to
two previous CBAs that contained the Rozelle Rule.102
The Eighth Circuit rejected the NFL’s argument and sided with
the district court.103 However, the Eighth Circuit declined to
follow the lower court’s ruling. Instead, the court suggested that
the parties collectively bargain in good faith to create a player
movement and inter-team compensation system.104 The court
required the parties to resolve this dispute through continued
negotiations because the parties were better suited to determine
their own mutual interests than the courts.105
Despite this significant victory for free agency, support for the
Players’ Association waned.106 In March 1977, the successor CBA
scaled back some of the victories the Union achieved in Mackey,
such as free agency.107 Among the additions to the 1977 CBA was
a modified format for player movement and compensation. Under
this new system, players who played out their contracts could
pursue free agency.108 However, teams had the option of matching
a competing team’s offer or they were compensated if the player

Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Powell III]. The Supreme Court has stated that limited
nonstatutory exemptions are proper compromises, and “that in order to properly
accommodate the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets
with the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the National Labor
Relations Act . . . certain union-employer agreements must be accorded a limited
nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions.” Id. at 782 (citing Connell Constr. Co.
v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975); Local Union
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 689 (1965)).
102
Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
103
The court of appeals stated that the Rozelle Rule was “significantly more restrictive
than necessary to serve any legitimate purpose[]” and “as implemented, contravene[d] the
Rule of Reason.” Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622–23.
104
Id. at 623.
105
Id.
106
NFLPA in the 1970s, supra note 75.
107
The 1977 CBA included impartial arbitration of non-injury grievances and, instead
of outright free agency, a modified free agency scheme that included a team’s right of
first refusal and compensation in the event a player was lost. BERRY ET AL., supra note
60, at 127; see also NFLPA in the 1970s, supra note 75.
108
BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 127.
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was lost. This proved to be an unworkable system as few players
changed teams.109
Following the 1981–82 season, the NFLPA held its annual
membership meeting in Albuquerque, New Mexico.110 Players
increasingly showed signs of unity as approximately one-third of
the Union’s membership (at least 537 players) attended the
event.111 During the meetings, the players adopted a proposal that
their compensation come from a pool of 55% of League
revenues.112 This scheme of player compensation was based on
years of service, playing time, and individual and team
performance.113
NFL management estimated that players were already
receiving 48% of League revenue and preferred a performancebased salary system without seniority considerations.114
Ownership worried that if salaries were based mostly on seniority,
the newly formed United States Football League would then raid
NFL talent.115 The League’s financial ability became a central
topic of debate amongst the parties. Jack Donlan, Executive
Director of the NFL Management Council,116 granted the Players’
Association’s request to inspect the League’s finances in a January
1982 letter.117 Ownership then reneged on this agreement and
109

Powell I, 678 F. Supp. 777, 780 (D. Minn. 1988) (“[D]uring the 5-year period
covered by the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement, fewer than 50 out of 600 players
received offers from other NFL clubs after becoming free agents.”), rev’d, 930 F.2d 1293
(8th Cir. 1989). The NFLPA website described the resulting trend in practice:
Although the new free agent system made sense in theory, since it
geared draft choice compensation to new salary offers made to the
free agent player, it did not anticipate the huge increases in club
revenues—and therefore salaries for players—which began occurring
one year after the 1977 CBA was signed. As a result, most players
were “worth” more than a first-round choice when they became free
agents.
NFLPA in the 1970s, supra note 75.
110
NFLPA History, supra note 56.
111
BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 130.
112
NFLPA History, supra note 56.
113
Id.
114
BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 131, 134.
115
Id.
116
The NFL Management Council is the NFL’s labor relations unit.
117
BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 131.
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instead proposed an anonymous audit for an average team.118 The
Union challenged Ownership’s refusal to provide financial
information through the NLRB.119 The Board upheld the League’s
position because the Union had no definitive basis from which to
demand 55% of the League’s gross revenues.120 This setback
meant the Union would have to take other action.
The Union continued with its plans to strike as the 1982 season
inched closer. Players joined hands prior to the start of each
preseason contest as a showing of solidarity, an action that drew
the ire of team owners.121 Four days prior to the regular season,
Ownership tendered a counter-offer to the Union that included
what was labeled as “$600 million in new money.”122 This
proposal broke down as $40 million in player benefits, $126
million in career adjustment bonuses for veterans, and $475
million for player salaries with the goal of increasing pay by 15%
per year during the agreement.123
Players would receive
retroactive annual increases of $10,000 for each season of player
participation between 1977 and 1982, and an additional $10,000
per each year played between 1983 and 1986.124 The NFLPA
rejected the revenue sharing agreement but kept the proposal’s
benefits and wage adjustments, proposing that $1.06 billion come
from 50% of the League’s television deal money.125 Ownership
rebuffed this proposal.
In response, the Union voted to strike after week two.126 The
League, in response, shut down team operations and barred players
118

See id.
Id.
120
The Union’s challenge was not a complete loss, however, as the NLRB’s General
Counsel ordered the League to provide the Union with some of the information it
requested. This sought-after information included broadcast contracts, players’ salaries,
and workers compensation insofar as knowing whether team doctors had financial
interests in the NFL clubs. While the Players’ Association did in fact receive some of the
requested data, it fell short of full financial disclosure. Id.
121
The Owners considered fining the players. Id. at 136.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 136–37.
125
Id. at 137.
126
Id.; see also The 1980’s—Era of Change, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N,
http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/History (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter
119

C08_LEVINE-MARAVENT_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

10/24/2010 1:03 PM

SPORTS LAW FORUM: FUMBLING AWAY THE SEASON

1439

from entering team facilities for any reason.127 Ownership also
said that players would not be paid for any additional games on the
schedule and would no longer receive medical treatment at team
facilities.128 Thus, both the Union and the League utilized their
available weapons, the strike and the lockout, during the
bargaining process.
A contentious relationship between lead negotiators further
complicated the bargaining process. The relationship between
Garvey and Donlan was so volatile that there was widespread
distrust among the parties, clouding whether a compromise could
be reached.129 Ownership only modified its stance twice: one
week into and then again forty days into the strike.130 The Players’
Association rejected both proposals.131 On the forty-fifth day of
the strike,132 Ownership offered what was labeled “money now”
bonuses133 to all players who had played at least three games into
their fourth season. The bonuses were to be payable at the time a
new CBA was signed.134 Ownership made a calculated move by
guaranteeing money to veteran players, a significant part of the
bargaining unit.135
The parties tentatively reached an agreement on November 16,
1982 and signed the new CBA on December 5, 1982 after another
three weeks of negotiations.136 In the new agreement, players
received their “money now” bonuses in the form of $60 million
from Ownership at the time the agreement was signed.137 Players
gained increases in minimum salary, pension pay, and pre-season
NFLPA in the 1980s]. Garvey classified the players’ strike as an unfair practice strike as
opposed to an economic strike, meaning that the NFL was violating the Players’ rights,
which gave rise to their right to strike without punishment. BERRY ET AL., supra note 60,
at 137.
127
BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 137.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 138.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
This date was more than seven weeks into the sixteen-game regular season.
133
The bonus offered to players in this instance was $60,000.00.
134
BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 138.
135
See id.
136
NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126.
137
Id.
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pay, and also the right to a second medical opinion, the right to
select a surgeon for injury-related operations, and the right to
inspect their club medical records.138 Yet still missing from the
new CBA was the true free agency scheme that much of the
NFLPA coveted.139
C. The NFLPA Finds a New Leader and Fights for True Free
Agency
During the life of the 1982 CBA negotiations, Ed Garvey left
his post as Executive Director and the Union elected former all-pro
guard Gene Upshaw in June 1983.140 When Union membership
was polled for key issues heading into negotiations for the 1987
CBA, the results clearly indicated that free agency was the
“highest priority.”141 The player mobility provisions of the prior
accord had been woefully ineffective, as “during the five year
period covered by the 1982 CBA, not a single veteran player
moved from one NFL club to another under the Right of First
Refusal/Compensation system.”142 While Upshaw was making his
rounds with the players and gathering important information for
the upcoming negotiations, Ownership was readying for another
labor stoppage. The League made arrangements to secure a $150
million line of credit for just such an event.143 This time,
Ownership appeared to possess even greater negotiating
leverage.144
The parties returned to the bargaining table to negotiate a
successor agreement to the 1982 CBA and made little progress.
Ownership quickly rejected the Union’s proposal for free agency
and although they still hoped for a compromise, players voted to

138

Id.
Goplerud, supra note 86, at 25.
140
NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126.
141
Id.
142
Powell I, 678 F. Supp. 777, 781 n.6 (D. Minn. 1988) (stating that “[o]f the 1,415
players who became veteran free agents during the term of the 1982 Agreement . . . ,
apparently only one player even received an offer from another club”), rev’d, 930 F.2d
1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
143
PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 248 (Paul F.
Clark, John T. Delaney & Ann C. Frost eds., Indus. Relations Research Ass’n 2002).
144
Id.
139
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strike.145 The League did not capitulate to Union demands and
instead hired replacement players.146 Games were played with
replacement players and television ratings suffered due to inferior
play, but they continued to be televised in order for the networks to
fulfill their contractual obligations. The Players’ Association knew
that a strike would not work if the Owners were willing to replace
the on-the-field product with “inferior talent.”147 Accordingly,
after just a few weeks, the Union voted to end its strike on October
15, 1987.148
Ownership’s leverage negated the Players’ Association’s
ability to wage an effective campaign through a strike. The Union
instead opted for litigation. On October 15, 1987, the last day of
its strike, the Players’ Association filed an antitrust lawsuit against
the League in United States Federal Court challenging, among
other practices, the League’s commissioner-determined right of
first refusal compensation system.149 The Union argued that the
NFL’s method of free agency violated section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act because it was an unreasonable restraint on trade.150
The League filed its own motion, asking the court to declare that
resolving the free agency issue can only occur “within the context
of the national labor laws, and that the nonstatutory ‘labor
exemption’ insulates the challenged restraints from antitrust
scrutiny.”151
The district court ruled that the nonstatutory labor exemption
did in fact insulate the League’s right of first refusal/compensation

145

Goplerud, supra note 86, at 26–27; see also NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126.
According to the Union, “[t]he NFL Management Council Executive Committee
(“CEC”) . . . believed that the [L]eague had been too soft on players in 1982 . . . . [The
CEC] also knew free agency would push veteran salaries up and force clubs to be more
competitive. That, of course, would mean less profit for . . . owners.” NFLPA in the
1980s, supra note 126.
147
Id.
148
Still working without a contract, the Union elected to file suit with the NLRB. Id.
149
NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126.
150
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The NFLPA also sued pursuant to sections 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26. See generally Powell I, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn.
1988), rev’d, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
151
Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 781.
146
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system.152 Because this issue was a mandatory subject of
bargaining, the nonstatutory labor exemption continued to protect
Ownership’s activities until the parties reached a bargaining
impasse.153 Thus, in order to protect the status quo and foster a
“stable environment in which to negotiate a new collective
bargaining agreement,”154 the nonstatutory labor exemption also
survived the expiration of the CBA until an impasse.155 The
district court stopped short of stating whether the parties had
reached an impasse, as the NFL had filed a charge with the NLRB
alleging that the Union had not bargained in good faith.156 The
court pointed out, “[b]ecause a finding of good faith must be made
as a precondition to determining impasse, the Court must await the
NLRB’s ‘good faith’ determination.”157 The NLRB eventually
issued a ruling that allowed the Players’ Association’s lawsuit to
continue.158
On appeal, the district court found that the nonstatutory labor
exemption did apply because the parties had negotiated to an
impasse.159 However, the district court refused to issue an
injunction, opining that “a preliminary injunction to secure
unrestricted free agency would wholly subvert the collective
bargaining process160 and thereby offend a central purpose of the
152

Id. The court opined that the free agency system provision of the 1982 CBA met the
three necessary elements under the Mackey Test. Id. at 783–84.
153
Id. at 785.
154
Id.
155
This occurs following intense, good faith negotiations, where the parties have
exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement, despite their best efforts. Id. at 788
(citing the standard as provided in Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967),
which states that an impasse exists after “good-faith negotiations have exhausted the
prospects of concluding and agreement”).
156
Id. at 789.
157
Id.
158
On April 28, 1988, the NLRB rendered its ruling, dismissing the League’s charge of
bad faith bargaining. Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Minn.
1988) [hereinafter Powell II]; see also Goplerud, supra note 86, at 27.
159
See Powell II, 690 F. Supp. at 814.
160
The court went further into its rationale by saying:
[i]t would be highly destructive to collective bargaining if major
issues could be removed from the bargaining table and preliminarily
resolved in isolation in antitrust litigation. If one of the parties to the
bargaining relationship were able to secure the substance of its
bargaining objectives by obtaining a preliminary injunction, there
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Norris-LaGuardia Act.”161 Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that the nonstatutory labor exemption
protected the Owners beyond impasse, and that as a result, the
Union could not bring an antitrust suit to enforce what should be
enforced through good faith bargaining.162 In other words, the
courts defer to federal labor law if the issue could be resolved
through the bargaining process or be heard before the NLRB. As
the Union was forced back to the bargaining table, it took note of
Justice Gerald Heaney’s dissent that subtly suggested a bold move:
disband the union so the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer
applies.163
D. Decertification and Challenging “Plan B” Free Agency
The Union took Justice Heaney’s counsel literally. On
November 3, 1989, two days after the Powell III decision, the
Union formally disclaimed any interest in representing NFL
players in collective bargaining.164
Player representatives
convened in Dallas on December 5, 1989 and finalized this
dramatic decision by ending the NFLPA’s official status as a
union.165 Instead, the NFLPA now exists more as a trade
association, lacking any authority to bargain on behalf of
players.166

would be very little motivation for that party to bargain in good faith
toward reaching an agreement. Judicial intervention at this stage of
the bargaining process would give one side a preliminary victory
while effectively disabling the other.
Powell II, 690 F. Supp. at 817.
161
Id.
162
Powell III, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989).
163
Justice Heaney wrote:
[t]he majority purports to reject the owners’ argument that the labor
exemption in this case continues indefinitely. The practical effect of
the majority’s opinion, however, is just that—because the labor
exemption will continue until the bargaining relationship is
terminated either by a NLRB decertification proceeding or by
abandonment of bargaining rights by the union.
Id. at 1305 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
164
NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126.
165
Id.
166
Goplerud, supra note 86, at 29.
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Between Powell I and Powell II, the League somewhat
modified its free agency system and established a process called
“Plan B Free Agency.”167 Under Plan B Free Agency, all NFL
teams preserved limited rights over no more than thirty-seven
players out of a forty-five man roster season.168 If a player was a
protected free agent, the team signing that player was obligated to
provide the previous club an opportunity to match the tenderingteam’s offer, or a right of first refusal.169 If the player’s former
organization chose not to match the offer, the signing club had to
provide compensation in the form of draft choices.170 Unprotected
players could negotiate contracts with a team of their choosing.
Plan B Free Agency allowed generally less talented players to, in
many instances, secure larger contracts than more highly skilled
players simply because protected players were precluded from
negotiating with other teams without compensating their original
club.171
Plan B Free Agency all but halted the mobility of marquee
players. Union leaders filed a class action lawsuit against the
League in response to this Rozelle Rule-like scheme.172 Because
the Union had disbanded, labor law no longer governed the parties’
relationship. The lawsuit challenged the League’s free agency
rules as an unlawful restraint of trade in court without contravening
labor law.173 The Players ultimately prevailed as a jury found in
their favor.174 The jury found that Plan B Free Agency deprived
players of the opportunity to freely offer their services as
professional football players to other teams, causing them to
167
See Ari Nissim, The Trading Game: NFL Free Agency, the Salary Cap, and a
Proposal for Greater Trading Flexibility, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 257, 260 (2004).
168
Id.
169
See Reynolds v. Nat’l Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 1978).
170
Thomas George, N.F.L.’s Free-Agency System Is Found Unfair by U.S. Jury, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at A1.
171
Nissim, supra note 167, at 260.
172
New York Jets running back Freeman McNeil was chosen as the lead plaintiff for
free agency because of his first name, Freeman (the symbolic nature of the name, as
“Free Man”). See generally McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn.
1992).
173
See McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D.
Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
174
See generally id.
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receive less compensation.175 The jury felt that these rules were
more restrictive than reasonably necessary to achieve the objective
of establishing or maintaining competitive balance within the
NFL.176 Through the McNeil decision and additional ensuing
litigation, the Union ended Plan B Free Agency177 and continued to
apply pressure on the Owners.
E. The Modern Era—a Time of Mutual Economic Gain and
Benefit
With the League now susceptible to attack through antitrust
law, Ownership began settlement talks with the Players’
Association in November 1992.178 During that time, Union leaders
had filed another lawsuit, White v. National Football League,
which sought true free agency and compensation relief through the
legal system.179 Ownership desired enactment of a mechanism to
curb unbridled free agency and protect smaller-market teams in the
form of a salary cap.180 Players sought true free agency. The
parties finally reached an agreement outside of court in January
1993, and submitted it to Judge David S. Doty of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota for a consent decree. The
settlement agreement submitted to Judge Doty contained a
provision that Judge Doty’s court would retain jurisdiction over the
enforcement and review of the agreement as well as all other
matters stemming from the eventual CBA.181 The stipulated
175

Id.
Id.
177
See generally Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992);
see also White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993) (class action
by Eagles defensive end Reggie White on behalf of all players).
178
Although it became increasingly evident that collective bargaining was going to
settle this dispute, Ownership still attempted to break Union solidarity. For instance,
Owners tried to steal players from the Union’s licensing arm over to the NFL’s licensing
arm by giving certain players more money. NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126 (noting
that Jim Kelly, Dan Marino, Bubby Brister, Warren Moon, Phil Simms, John Elway,
Boomer Esiason, Troy Aikman, Jim Everett, and Randall Cunningham all defected to
NFL Properties).
179
See generally White, 822 F. Supp. at 1389.
180
The 1990’s—Growth of the Union, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nfl
players.com/about-us/History (last visited Dec. 30, 2009) [hereinafter NFLPA in the
1990s].
181
See White v. Nat’l Football League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir. 2009).
176
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settlement agreement was signed on April 30, 1993 and contained
all of the major provisions sought by both sides. Settlement finally
came through compromise. Once the CBA was approved and the
consent decree was in place to settle the White antitrust lawsuit, the
NFL voluntarily recognized the NFLPA as the Players’
Association’s bargaining representative.182 Finally there was labor
peace between the NFL and the NFLPA.
Over the years, the NFLPA and the League extended their
1993 agreement five times. The most recent extension took place
in March 2006 when both sides voted to extend the CBA through
the 2011 season. Ownership voted thirty-to-two to accept the
NFLPA’s final proposal. Each vote to extend the collective
bargaining agreement was also a vote against uncertainty and to
maintain the status quo. However, on May 20, 2008, in the midst
of the worst recession in decades, League owners unanimously
voted to opt out of the agreement.183
Under the CBA, the 2010 season operates as the agreement’s
final year if one of the parties opts out.184 Further, the 2010 season
will operate without a salary cap.185 While this may be perceived
as being beneficial to NFL players, there are drawbacks. For
instance, there is no salary floor, meaning that Ownership can
spend as little as it desires on player salaries.186 Other negatives
include the extension of free agency eligibility from four years to
six years of service, franchises’ ability to use an additional
franchise tag, and restrictions on a playoff team’s ability to sign
free agents.187 Thus the players will also be penalized in the
uncapped year.
182

This occurred after a majority of players signed authorization cards and the
American Arbitration Association acknowledged the NFLPA. See White, 822 F. Supp. at
1435. The NFLPA membership vote to ratify the new CBA was 952 for, and 34 against.
NFLPA in the 1990s, supra note 180.
183
NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=
09000d5d80868b78&template=without-video&confirm=true (last visited Dec. 30, 2009).
184
NFL-CBA Related Questions and Answers, SI.COM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
2010/football/nfl/01/20/cba.qa/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Tom Curran, Goodell on Work Stoppage, NBCSPORTS.COM, Mar. 23, 2009,
http://blogs.nbcsports.com/home/archives/2009/03/goodell-on-work-stoppage.html; see
also Maske, NFL Appears, supra note 50.
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In its view, Ownership opted out early because it was an
unreasonable fiscal obligation to spend more than half of NFL
combined revenue on player expenses without getting some
concession or cooperation from the Union in return. In particular,
the League was referring to costs associated with the massive
stadium initiative undertaken in the late 1990s under
Commissioner Tagliabue’s leadership. The League released a
statement addressing its reasons for opting out, attributing its
decision to the high cost of player salaries and having to spend
significant money on stadium construction, operations, and
improvements.188 According to the NFL’s statement, these facts
along with the recession prevent Owners from wanting to invest in
the game under the current CBA.189
Ownership has taken issue with other material elements of the
current deal. For example, the CBA effectively prohibits clubs
from recouping bonuses paid to players who, after signing, breach
their player contracts or refuse to perform.190 This issue was
exemplified by the events surrounding the incarceration of former
Atlanta Falcons’ quarterback and convicted dog fighting ring
financier Michael Vick. Vick was able to keep most of his twenty
million dollar signing bonus even though he was in prison and
unable to play.191 The League now seeks to bargain over the
handling of this type of issue.
Owners are also dissatisfied with the rising salaries of rookie
players. Some first year players make more money than veterans
who have already proven their worth. In 2006, Ownership failed
to allocate ample time to examine how to curb rookie salaries
during those negotiations. Now the NFL wishes to negotiate better

188

Jason Cole, Owners Opt Out, YAHOO SPORTS (May 20, 2008), http://sports.
yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=jc-optout052008&prov=yhoo&type=lgns.
189
Id.
190
See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, art. XIV, § 9 (2006).
191
See White v. Nat’l Football League, No. 4-92-906(DSD), 2008 WL 1827423, at *1
(D. Minn. Apr. 22, 2008); see also Judge: Vick Can Keep $20M Signing Bonus,
CBS.COM, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/04/sports/main3785
994.shtml?source= RSSattr=U.S._3785994.
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terms for its member clubs and allocate more resources for players
who prove themselves.192
Although Mr. Upshaw strongly opposed a rookie salary
scale,193 many members of his constituency were in favor of a
rookie pay scale.194 It was in the best interests of many players to
have CBA mechanisms that curtail large rookie bonuses and other
forms of guaranteed compensation in order to free up salary cap
space for veteran contracts.195 Sadly, the NFLPA’s hard-line
stance against a rookie salary scale changed, as Mr. Upshaw
passed away on August 21, 2008196 after losing a short bout with
pancreatic cancer.197 The successor to the iconic former all-pro
and union leader would take a different viewpoint on many NFLUnion issues, including rookie wage scales.
After a lengthy, and at times controversial,198 search for a new
executive director, the Union settled on pro football outsider
DeMaurice Smith.
Each of the Union’s thirty-two player
representatives voted in favor of Smith, a lawyer with no
professional football ties and no labor law experience.199 Smith is
192

See Dan Wetzel, Rookie Salaries Out of This League, YAHOO SPORTS (Apr. 25,
2008), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=dw-draftsalaries042408.
193
See Gene Upshaw, 100 Words from Gene Upshaw for April 28, NFLPA.COM (Apr.
28, 2008), http://www.nflplayers.com/Articles/NFLPAs-Weekly-Message/100-WordsFrom-Gene-Upshaw-for-April-28.
194
See Michael David Smith, Tomlinson Favors Rookie Cap, PRO FOOTBALL TALK
(June 20, 2008), http://www.profootballtalk.com/2008/06/20/tomlinson-favors-rookiecap; see also Mike Florio, Mawae Doesn’t Like Rookie Windfalls, PRO FOOTBALL TALK
(May 21, 2008), http://www.profootballtalk.com/2008/05/21/mawae-doesnt-like-rookiewindfalls.
195
Deubert & Wong, supra note 43, at 228.
196
A potential byproduct of Upshaw’s tragic death may be the erosion of any rapport
the Union may have possessed with Goodell and other members of the Management
Council.
197
Hall of Famer Upshaw Loses Battle with Pancreatic Cancer, ESPN.COM, Aug. 21,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3545830.
198
See Mike Florio, Lawsuit Claims that Troy Vincent Was Undermining Upshaw, PRO
FOOTBALL TALK (Sept. 1, 2009), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/09/01/lawsuit
-claims-that-troy-vincent-was-undermining-gene-upshaw; see also NFLPA: Feds
Investigating Alleged Collusion Between Goodell, Vincent, USA TODAY, Sept. 2, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2009-09-01-nflpa-investigation_N.htm.
199
Mark Maske, DeMaurice Smith Elected New Union Leader, WASH. POST, Mar. 15,
2009, http://views.washingtonpost.com/theleague/nflnewsfeed/2009/03/demaurice-smithelected-new-union-leader.html; see also Attorney Smith Elected to Succeed Upshaw as
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a former partner at the Washington, D.C.-based firm of Patton
Boggs and is a former United States attorney with connections to
many key government figures, including current Attorney General
Eric Holder and President Obama.200 Smith pledged that he would
use his substantial political connections to assist the players during
negotiations.201 While Smith’s rhetoric initially took a conciliatory
tone when referring to the lockout with the NFL, his language is
now escalating and becoming pessimistic.202
Formal negotiations between the parties began in summer 2009
but the verbal jousting began long before these discussions. While
each side publicly approached these talks with the expectation that
they would be productive, the opposite seems to be occurring.
Smith notified his constituency that the NFL intends to lock out the
players in 2011 and, although both sides continue to negotiate,
players should begin to save at least one-fourth of their earnings
during the next two years.203 The Union is further preparing for a
labor stoppage by creating a strike/lockout fund.204 This fund will
be established through a 50% increase in union dues for the 2009
and 2010 seasons.205 Another trend beginning to emerge in the
NFLPA Executive Director, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80f469df&template=withoutvideo&confirm
=true [hereinafter Attorney Smith Elected].
200
Jeff Levine, After Bargaining Session, NFL Players Association Takes Message to
Washington, BIZ OF FOOTBALL (July 21, 2009), http://www.bizoffootball.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=469:after-bargaining-session-nfl-playersassociation-takes-message-to-washington&catid=44:articles-and-opinion&Itemid=61.
201
See Michael David Smith, DeMaurice Smith: ‘If It’s Going to Be a Fight, Lets Get It
Going,’ NFL FANHOUSE (May 16, 2009), http://nfl.fanhouse.com/2009/05/16/demauricesmith-if-its-going-to-be-a-fight-lets-get-it-goin.
202
See Jim Corbett, Smith: NFLPA Hopes for ‘Peace,’ Prepares for ‘War’ with
Owners, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/
2009-03-16-nflpa-update_N.htm.
203
Scott Brown & Carl Prine, Union Chief: NFL Headed for Lockout, PITTSBURGH
TRIB.-REV., Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.pittsburghlive.com:8000/x/pittsburghtrib/sports/
s_638933.html.
204
NFLPA Votes to Start Fund for ’11 in Case of Lockout or Strike, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/
133277.
205
Liz Mullen of the SportsBusiness Journal reported that the NFLPA, on September
21, 2009,
sent out a notice to agents that active NFL player dues for the ’09 and
’10 seasons are being increased from $10,000 to $15,000 per player
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early stage of bargaining is the League’s summary rejection of any
and all NFLPA proposals,206 a tactic that is eerily familiar to the
beginning stages of the NHL lockout.207 The Union believes that
this familiar tactic is the work of League outside counsel Bob
Batterman and, like the NHL labor stoppage, Owners will wait to
engage in substantive negotiations until the current CBA has
expired.208
The NHL and NFL conflicts also share a common element in
that the NFL and NHL labor stoppages involve attempts by both
labor and management to gain leverage through use of the media.
Although each denies their interest in utilizing the media to
communicate their respective message, both Goodell and Smith are
using such methods to transmit increasingly contentious
messages209 to each other and the public. Both sides understand
the importance of controlling and manipulating the media, as
public support hinges on the information disseminated through
various media outlets. As detailed in Part III, the most recent

in order to create a “dues lockout fund.” NFL player agents’ annual
membership fees have not been affected, sources said. For players, in
addition to the flat annual $15,000 dues, those who are eligible to
receive the equal share licensing royalty payments due them by NFL
Players, Inc will have their dues increased by that amount as well for
’09 and ’10. In past years that payment equaled approximately
$10,000 per player—which means dues for those players will equal
about $25,000.
NFLPA Increasing Yearly Players Dues to Establish Lockout Fund, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/
133481.
206
See, e.g., Judy Battista, Players’ Bid to Keep Salary Cap Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2010, at B16; NFLPA Says Proposed One-Year Extension of CBA Rejected by
League, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.sports
businessdaily.com/article/137461.
207
See Jeff Levine, Labor Web Site for NFL Mirrors NHL’s Past Effort, BIZ OF
FOOTBALL (Feb. 13, 2010), http://www.bizoffootball.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=631:labor-web-site-for-nfl-mirrors-nhls-past-effort&catid=34:
nfl-news&Itemid=53.
208
See Liz Mullen, NFL Rejects Players’ ‘Lock-in’ Idea for Future Labor Talks,
SPORTING NEWS TODAY, Nov. 3, 2009, at 21 [hereinafter Mullen, NFL Rejects Players’],
available at http://today.sportingnews.com/sportingnewstoday/20091103/?pg=21&pm=
1&u1=friend#pg21.
209
Smith Waiting for Formal CBA Proposal, ESPN.COM, Sept. 9, 2009, http://sports.
espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4457637.
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lockout in professional sports illustrates that either side can win a
labor stoppage by influencing the public’s view on the matter.
Understanding this concept may provide some clues as to how both
the NFL and the Union will proceed if there indeed is a lockout in
2011.
III. RECOUNTING THE NHL LOCKOUT
A. From Enjoying Unrivaled Success to Facing-Off Against Dire
Financial Straits
The NHL faced a financial crisis earlier this decade that is
similar to the dilemma confronting the NFL. Professional hockey
enjoyed a period of tremendous growth in the late 1990s, both
economically and in fan viewership. However, the NHL seemed to
be in dire straits in the early portion of the new millennium. The
majority of NHL franchises claimed an operating loss.210 Several
franchises reported losses of at least $30 million and four teams
had recently filed for bankruptcy protection.211
NHL
Commissioner Gary Bettman asserted that player salaries were the
chief reason for each team’s financial losses and that a salary cap
was the only solution.212 The NHL lobbied NHLPA Executive
Director Bob Goodenow213 to consider a salary cap for the good of

210
Nineteen out of the NHL’s thirty teams claimed an operating loss. See Stephen M.
Yoost, The National Hockey League and Salary Arbitration: Time for a Line Change, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 485, 491–92 (2006).
211
Id.
212
See Alan Adams, NHL and Union Reject New Proposals, USA TODAY, Dec. 14,
2004, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/2004-12-14-labor-talks_x.htm (“We
only know of really one approach to meaningfully address and fix our problems. And
that means we need to forge an economic partnership [implement a salary cap] . . . . We
need to be together—teams and players, league and union—working together to grow
this game and I don’t think there’s any substitute for that.” (quoting Bettman) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
213
Mr. Goodenow played college hockey at Harvard and after completing his brief
NHL playing career, received his J.D. from the University of Detroit Law School. Mr.
Goodenow assumed leadership of the NHLPA in 1992.
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the game; however, it also started accumulating a war chest in case
of a work stoppage.214
After the 2002–03 NHL season, the NHL began using the
media to publicly justify locking out players. Commissioner
Bettman asserted that NHL player salaries were disproportionately
larger when compared to other major sports.215 He illustrated this
point by saying that the NHL would “lose less money by not
playing” hockey next season.216 To validate Bettman’s assertion,
the League retained former SEC Chairperson Arthur Levitt to
prepare a finances audit of NHL revenues and losses.217 The audit
showed that NHL teams collectively lost $273 million during the
2002–03 season;218 it further unveiled that “an astounding 73% of
NHL revenue was paid to players in the 2002–2003 season,
significantly [more]” when compared with the other major sports
in America.219 The NHLPA attacked the accuracy of the report,
calling it “flawed”220 and asserting that the report was “‘simply
another league public relations initiative [to blame the players for
hockey’s financial situation].’”221 This report and the resulting
exchange between the two sides helped sow seeds of distrust that
eventually led to the longest labor dispute in professional sports.

214

The NHL mandated that each club contribute $10 million into a “rainy day” fund,
which would most likely be used to cover financial loses as a result of the looming labor
stoppage. Abrams, supra note 16, at 61–62.
215
Bettman, prior to the lockout, continuously cited the report stating “players get 76
percent of all league revenues—far more than the percentage for the other major team
sports.” Associated Press, ‘We Can’t Live Any Longer’ Under This CBA, ESPN.COM,
May 26, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=1809397.
216
Commish Claims Locked-Out Union in Denial, ESPN.COM, Nov. 2, 2004,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=1914328.
217
Liebman, supra note 16, at 91–92.
218
Yoost, supra note 210, at 491.
219
Jonathan Kotler, Parallel Unionism in Professional Hockey: Redefining the
Nonstatutory Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 843, 847 (2007).
220
Associated Press, NHL Lockout Chronology, ESPN.COM, Feb. 16, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1993004&type=story; see also Liebman, supra
note 16, at 92 (“Forbes Magazine conducted a study of league revenues and expenditures
during the 2002–2003 season. Forbes reported that teams lost $123 million and that the
league spent only 66% of its revenues on player salaries.”).
221
See NHLPA’s Goodenow Issues Response, TSN.COM, Feb. 12, 2004,
http://www.tsn.ca/nhl/story/?id=71954.
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B. 2004 Lockout
The NHL remained resolute in its necessity of achieving cost
certainty.
“We can’t live any longer under [this] CBA,”
Commissioner Bettman maintained.222 Both sides knew the danger
a labor stoppage posed; a prior lockout in 1994 had reversed years
of fan development in North America. Television ratings had
suffered as a result of the lost games.223 Despite the substantial
risks associated with any labor stoppage, Bettman realized that
curtailing player costs was paramount to the League’s financial
viability. This meant securing a salary cap regardless of the
consequences.224
Bettman was determined to learn from the mistakes the league
had made during prior labor stoppages.225 Ownership would stay
disciplined and not make any concessions until players accepted a
salary cap. The NHL’s strategy seemed to include a component of
using the press to convince the public that a salary cap was
necessary to save the game. This message put the NHLPA in a
difficult public relations position, as it had already backed itself
into a corner by refusing to accept any proposal with a salary cap.
Goodenow’s steadfast refusal to even consider this cost control
provision allowed the media to cast blame on the players for not
making financial concessions necessary to save the game.
Sensing that the upcoming labor conflict would be long in
duration, Goodenow attempted to prepare his side for a prolonged
lockout. However, he was unsure whether players were willing to
sacrifice one or two seasons of guaranteed salary in order to avoid
a cap.226 NHL owners considered using replacement players as the
lockout began in earnest. In response, Goodenow reportedly
mandated that any player who chose to cross party lines would be
222

Attorney Smith Elected, supra note 199.
See Jake Fisher, Television and the Potential NFL Lockout, HARV. SPORTS ANALYSIS
COLLECTIVE, Nov. 18, 2009, http://harvardsportsanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/
television-and-the-potential-nfl-lockout.
224
Id.
225
In prior labor conflicts, NHL owners had lacked cohesion and conceded to player
demands. For example, NHL owners locked players out in 1995 in order to secure a
salary cap. However, owners were unable to maintain a united front and ended up
signing a new CBA that lacked a salary cap.
226
Avoiding a cap would benefit future NHL players.
223
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obligated to pay back to the NHLPA all player benefits received
during the work stoppage.227 This amount totaled between $5,000
and $10,000 per each month of the labor stoppage.228 The NHL
responded to this edict by filing an unfair labor practice (“ULP”)
against the Players Association,229 calling such a practice
“coercive.”230 This ULP filing quashed any hope that both sides
would quickly find common ground and work to save the season.
On February 16, 2005, the NHL canceled the season. As the
lockout trudged on, players were the first side to exhibit signs of
breaking solidarity.231 Players were not willing to sacrifice a
significant portion of their career to fight a cap through a
prolonged labor dispute.232
Some players were reportedly
communicating with general managers, owners, and the media.233
This activity undermined Goodenow’s position. The owners, in
contrast and unlike during prior labor stoppages, did not break
rank234 and presented a united front. It soon became evident to
Goodenow that his union was neither united nor willing to sacrifice
several seasons in order to avoid a salary cap.235 Bettman’s new
NHL would involve a salary cap. Some leaders within the NHLPA
227

League Dislikes NHLPA’s Replacement Player Stance, ESPN.COM, Mar. 27, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2022161.
228
Id.
229
Id. Any player who crossed the picket line was at risk of violating § 8(b)(1) of the
NLRB. See generally Overview of the National Labor Relations Act, NLRB,
http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/overview/national_labor_relations_act.aspx (last visited
Jan. 3, 2010).
230
Associated Press, NHL Files an Unfair Labor Practice Charge with NLRB, WASH.
POST, at D03. “The practice of conditioning the receipt of work stoppage benefits on a
player’s agreement not to return to the NHL without a new CBA was coercive, and in
violation of the player’s rights under the labor laws,” NHL Chief Legal Officer Bill Daly
said. Id.
231
Because players were beginning to crack just months into the lockout, it seemed
unreasonable to believe that they would last through 2006. Sheila Bloch & Lee Clark,
Report to the NHLPA Executive Board and Members 40 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
232
Players were not prepared for a prolonged strike or to sacrifice the only asset they
had: their career. Id.
233
Id. at 39.
234
Id. at 41 (discussing how the critical part of the lockout was won by ownership due
to Bettman policing management and maintaining a united front against the players).
235
Id. at 46 (discussing the players’ trepidation concerning a prolonged work stoppage
in hockey).
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realized the union needed to change its strategy since its
membership was capitulating to a salary cap.236 Disagreement
over the appropriate new strategy created a rift among the union’s
leadership.
As more serious negotiations began, the NHLPA split into
several factions: those who supported a salary cap (this strategy
was led by Goodenow’s number two and NHLPA general counsel,
Ted Saskin) and those still loyal to Goodenow, who would not vote
for a cap.237 Whether it was a purposeful strategy by the NHL or
just a fortunate occurrence, a wedge began to form between
Goodenow and other senior union members.238 Goodenow’s
control on the CBA negotiation process began to weaken.239
Saskin started to emerge as the more effective NHLPA negotiator.
The NHL attempted to eliminate Goodenow from the negotiation
process entirely by suggesting to Saskin that he “keep the lines of
communication open” with Bettman’s number two, Bill Daly.240
Increasingly, both Saskin and Daly assumed the roles as
negotiators of the new CBA. This isolation of Goodenow, in
effect, allowed Saskin to legitimize himself as the de facto union
leader.241
Negotiations began progressing more smoothly once
Goodenow became less of a factor. Saskin agreed to a salary cap
and tension in the bargaining process began to ease. Eventually,
the sides agreed to a new CBA in principle.242 One byproduct of
the cap-inclusive CBA was the resignation of Goodenow. The
aftermath of the lockout left the NHLPA in an extremely weakened
state. Since the conclusion of the lockout, the union has gone
through at least two different executive directors243 and is currently
236

Id. (stating that the Union’s mantra of “no cap” was no longer an option).
Id. at 49.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Key Terms of NHL Agreement, ESPN.COM, July 13, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.
com/nhl/columns/story?id=2107128.
242
Sides Will Have to Ratify New CBA, ESPN.COM, July 13, 2005, http://sports.
espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2106776.
243
See Maury Brown, Ian Penny Steps Down as Interim Exec. Director of NHLPA, BIZ
OF HOCKEY (Oct. 31, 2009), http://www.bizofhockey.com (search “Ian Penny Steps
237
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without an executive director, general counsel, or outside legal
counsel. Now, the National Football League has Bob Batterman
serving as outside counsel. Mr. Batterman may provide the NFL a
blueprint similar to the one utilized by the NHL during its recent
lockout.
IV. THE PERTINENT LAWS, POSITIONS, AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE
PARTIES
A. Statement of the Case
NFL ownership gravitated toward labor uncertainty in 2008
when it elected to opt out of the CBA extension signed only two
years prior. The single biggest issue in need of renegotiation is the
League’s rising labor costs. Initially, the Union’s leadership
responded to this event by quipping that Ownership “just [doesn’t]
like what [it] agreed to in March of 2006” and that if Ownership
locked out the players, the Union would decertify, thereby
disabling labor law and enabling the Union to sue the NFL under
antitrust law.244 However, as time has passed and leadership has
changed within the Players’ Association, a quick defusing of this
potential lockout seems like wishful thinking. Both sides have
done little bargaining and have instead opted to pad their
respective war chests and prepare for a protracted, and potentially
contentious, negotiation process.

Down,” result will be fourth from top); see also Liz Mullen, Paul Kelly Fired as
Executive Director of NHLPA, SPORTING NEWS TODAY, Aug. 31, 2009,
http://www.sportingnews.com/nhl/article/2009-08-31/report-paul-kelly-fired-executivedirector-nhlpa; NHLPA Fires Executive Director Ted Saskin, CBC.COM, May 10, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/story/2007/05/10/nhlpa-saskin-fired.html.
244
Lester Munson, Storm Clouds Gather and Lockout Looms Large in NFL Labor
Strife, ESPN.COM, Mar. 12, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?id=
3288568.

C08_LEVINE-MARAVENT_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

10/24/2010 1:03 PM

SPORTS LAW FORUM: FUMBLING AWAY THE SEASON

1457

B. Applicable Law
1. The National Labor Relations Act and Refusals to Bargain
Collectively
The National Labor Relations Act245 (the “NLRA” or the
“Act”) is the guidepost by which all collective bargaining exists.
Central to the Act is the duty to bargain collectively in good faith,
as this process is intended to be a tool to foster industrial peace:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or
the negotiation of an agreement . . . and the
execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession . . . .246
Section 158(a)(5) of the Act states that an employer’s refusal to
bargain collectively with its employee representatives is grounds
for an unfair labor practice247 and that a labor organization or its
agent’s refusal to bargain collectively with the employer is also
grounds for a ULP.248 The statutory language only states that there
is a duty to bargain in good faith; the NLRB and the federal courts
have rendered opinions establishing what is and what is not
bargaining in good faith. Section 8(5) of The Wagner Act of
1935249 established an employer’s “refus[al] to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees” as an unfair labor

245

29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006).
Id. § 158(d).
247
This is subject to § 159(a), which involves the construction industry and is outside
the scope of this Comment.
248
Id. § 158(b)(3).
249
This is the original version of the National Labor Relations Act. National Labor
Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69).
246
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practice.250 In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Amendments added the
requirement that unions must collectively bargain.251 As defined
by the Supreme Court, the purpose of the Act is to provide a
vehicle for the “free opportunity for negotiation with accredited
representatives of employees . . . [and] to promote industrial
peace.”252
2. The Bargaining Obligation
Primarily, the Act calls on the parties “to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.”253 There is no
mandate that the parties reach an actual agreement; however, there
is a requirement that both sides attempt to find an amicable
resolution.254 The requirements of the parties can be broken down
as follows: the duty to meet, confer, and negotiate, and the
obligation to deal in good faith.
a) The Duty to Meet, Confer, and Negotiate
Nowhere in the Act does it state how many times or how often
the parties must meet in order to satisfy its good faith duty.255 The
requirement to meet at reasonable times was discussed in NLRB v.
Highland Park Manufacturing Co.,256 where the union was
negotiating a draft proposal of an agreement with management.257
After the second negotiating session was cut short due to the
company president’s illness, the vice president took over. He met
with the union twice more and then stopped negotiating.258 The
Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board that the company’s response
to the union when taken collectively amounted to a refusal to
250

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–44); see also JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR.,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 824 (BNA Books 2006) (1970).
252
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45–47 (1937).
253
29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
254
See generally HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 825.
255
Id.
256
110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940).
257
Id. at 634.
258
Id.
251
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bargain because the employer had no intent of reaching an
agreement with the union.259 The court elaborated that the
endgame in collective bargaining is not necessarily an agreement,
but the desire to forge an accord.
The court opined the mere act of meeting with no intention of
ever agreeing to an accord is evidence of a lack of good faith.260
“If some valid reason had been advanced for unwillingness to
reduce agreements to writing, this conclusion would not
necessarily follow; but in the absence of explanation, it clearly
indicates respondent’s hostility to the whole process of collective
bargaining.”261 The court likened the coming to terms of an
agreement to “an industrial constitution of the enterprise;” if a
party is not interested in coming to an agreement, then there is no
interest in industrial harmony.262
b) The Obligation to Deal in Good Faith
Like the duty to confer, meet, and negotiate, the obligation to
deal in good faith is not precisely defined. The United States
Supreme Court adopted this concept in 1940 when it decided
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB,263 a case where the employer
refused to acknowledge the union as the designated bargaining
representative.264 The employer’s president “declined to recognize
the [u]nion as the bargaining representative of all the employees,
and declared that he would negotiate with it only as the bargaining
representative of the Union members, refusing to bargain with it as
the representative of all the employees, a plain violation of the
Act.”265 The company president then refused to negotiate with the
union altogether.266 The Court concluded that the negotiations the
employer entered into “were not entered into by the [employer] in
259

Id. at 637.
Id. at 637–38.
261
Id. at 638.
262
Id.
263
309 U.S. 350 (1940).
264
The employer also attempted to circulate a petition amongst the employees to have
an employer-dominated committee negotiate the CBA. Some employees signed and then
subsequently cancelled their signatures. See id. at 358.
265
Id.
266
Id.
260
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good faith, and were but thinly disguised refusals to treat with the
Union representatives.”267
The determinative issue was whether the employer had actually
intended to negotiate with the union. More recent examples of an
employer’s refusal to bargain in good faith are abundant.268 The
decisions all demonstrate the Act’s desire to have the parties
negotiate with the vision of reaching an agreement. An employer’s
conduct is generally evaluated under the totality of the particular
circumstances.269 Any alleged bad faith conduct in question may
take place at or away from the bargaining table.270
3. Subjects of Bargaining
The Act classifies the failure of the parties to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith as to “wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment” as an unfair labor
practice.271 These three areas are considered “mandatory subjects
of bargaining,” and are subjects that the parties must negotiate in
good faith in an attempt to reach an agreement.272 While the Act
only classifies three items as mandatory subjects, the list of actual
negotiation terms is much more expansive.
In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,273 an
employer insisted on a “ballot clause,” which called for a secret
ballot election for employees as to the employer’s last pre-strike
offer, and a “recognition clause” excluding the international union
as the official bargaining representative of the union.274 At issue
was whether this conduct amounted to a refusal to bargain over
non-mandatory terms.275 The employer felt it had complied with
its duties insofar as coming to terms on the three mandatory
subjects, but its insistence on non-mandatory terms in the
267

Id.
See, e.g., Radisson Plaza Minneapolis v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1376, 1378–79 (8th Cir.
1993); Excel Fire Prot. Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 241 (1992).
269
See Radisson Plaza, 987 F.2d at 1381.
270
Id.
271
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
272
Id.
273
356 U.S. 342 (1958).
274
Id. at 343.
275
Id. at 344.
268
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agreement was the basis of the alleged unfair labor practice.276
The Court’s analysis of the Act as well as the employer’s conduct
supported the Board’s sustained ULP charge.277 The Borg-Warner
decision thus created the distinction between mandatory and
permissive subjects of bargaining.
Mandatory subjects of bargaining directly impact wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment. 278 These topics
must be bargained for by the parties.279 Permissive bargaining
subjects may be negotiated but such agreements are not
mandatory.280 These subjects may include retiree benefits, internal
union matters (such as how union representatives are elected, the
amount of union dues, union officer structure, etc.), supervisors’
conditions of employment, interest arbitration, legal liability
clauses, and the make-up of the employer’s board of trustees or
directors.281 A unilateral change of a mandatory subject of
bargaining falls into a certain category of violations. By virtue of
this conduct, this type of action is considered a per se violation of
the Act.282
4. Per Se Violations
In NLRB v. Katz,283 the Court held that an employer’s unilateral
change in granting merit increases, sick leave policy, and wage
increases during its contract negotiations with the union (and prior
to reaching an impasse) evidenced a per se violation of its
276

Id. at 348–49.
Id. at 349–50.
278
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
279
Some examples of mandatory subjects in the NFL-NFLPA bargaining context
include salary, holiday pay, bonus pay, step pay (including pay for rookies), vacations,
discipline, union dues check off, grievance procedures (injury and non-injury), uniforms,
and drug testing.
280
HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 831.
281
There are also “illegal subjects of bargaining,” which include discrimination against
certain groups of people, hot cargo clauses (allowing workers to refuse to handle
materials/goods from a struck facility or on an “unfair” list), and closed shop clauses (a
provision that all employees are union members before being hired).
282
See, e.g., Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991) (reaffirming
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), and holding that it is an unfair labor practice to
unilaterally implement a change to a mandatory subject of bargaining after contract
termination without first bargaining to impasse).
283
369 U.S. 736 (1962).
277
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requirement to bargain in good faith.284 Even if the employer
exhibited “subjective good faith” in reaching an agreement, a
unilateral change is nonetheless evidence of a violation because it
circumvents the duty to negotiate.285 This circumvention frustrates
the objectives of § 8(a)(5) and is tantamount to a flat refusal to
bargain.286
5. Good Faith
In 1947, the “good faith” requirement was incorporated into
section 8(d) of the NLRA.287 This good faith requirement means
employers and employee organizations must meet and confer with
an open mind and with the intent of reaching an agreement.288
While there is no single definition of good faith in the context of
labor relations, ascertaining whether an individual bargained in
good faith centrally involves evaluating a party’s subjective state
of mind and asking whether there exists an inclination to engage in
sincere negotiations with an intent to settle differences and arrive
at an agreement.289
The NLRB and courts examine the facts of each case when
dealing with a ULP charge. In NLRB v. General Electric Co.,290
the court upheld the Board’s decision that General Electric’s “take
it or leave it” attitude during negotiations, its dealings with
individual locals instead of the international union, as well as a
media blitz against the union, constituted an unfair labor practice,
despite the fact that the union signed a contract.291 In addition,
General Electric only furnished part of the information requested
after the end of the strike.292 General Electric also switched its
position several times as to union offers, which stifled the pace of

284

Id. at 741–42.
Id. at 743.
286
See id.
287
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
288
See HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 856.
289
See NLRB v. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F.2d 18, 22 (9th Cir. 1938).
290
418 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1969).
291
See id. at 746–56. This tactic is also known as “Boulwareism.” See Marc
Mandelman & Kevin Manara, Staying Above the Surface—Surface Bargaining Claims
Under The National Labor Relations Act, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 261, 270 (2007).
292
Gen. Elec., 418 F.2d at 753.
285
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negotiations.293 The court reasoned that the employer’s refusal to
provide information within a timely manner forced the union into a
position where it was “unable to bargain intelligently.”294 As to
the charge that the employer failed to bargain in good faith, the
court compared it to “a mosaic of many pieces, but depending not
on any one alone.”295 However, a specific violation alone could
also be evidence of a failure to bargain in good faith as well.296
6. Examples of Good and Bad Faith
A failure to bargain in good faith (which illustrates bad faith) is
typically inferred from a party’s conduct at or away from the
bargaining table because a participant’s intent to frustrate an
agreement is rarely articulated.297 As such, a party’s conduct under
the circumstances is highly probative. One example of a failure to
bargain in good faith is surface bargaining. The term “surface
bargaining” connotes “going through the motions” of negotiating
as opposed to demonstrating a genuine desire to reach an
agreement.298 Thus, the requirement of conferring in good faith is
more comprehensive than just meeting, or engaging in repetitive
discussion of formalities that lack any meaning, thereby leading
one party to declare an impasse or engage in some other antibargaining action.299
An illustration of these principles in practice is Unbelievable,
Inc. v. NLRB.300 In Unbelievable, Inc., the employer engaged in a
series of acts from pre-negotiation through the eventual strike that
evidenced a desire to continuously goad the union into striking.301
There never was any desire to actually negotiate with the union.302
The employer’s attorney scolded union representatives after the

293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302

Id.
Id.
Id. at 756.
Id.
HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 827.
Id. at 864.
See, e.g., Wheatland Elec. Coop. Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1953).
118 F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
See id. at 796–99.
Id. at 797.
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first bargaining session. Three sessions followed in five months.303
The employer never considered the union’s counter-proposal, and
after the second meeting, the employer’s attorney declared
impasse.304
In another demonstrative case, Atlanta Hilton & Tower v.
International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, AFL-CIO,305 the
Board set forth seven factors that signal a party’s refusal to bargain
in good faith.306 In this case, the Board ruled that the employer did
not negotiate in bad faith, despite failing to honor the union’s
request for certain financial information, because it was merely
holding firm on its offer for a one year contract.307 The parties met
thirteen times, and the overall conduct of the employer was
justified as “hard bargaining, rather than surface bargaining.”308
Therefore, whether a party is engaging in hard bargaining instead
of surface bargaining depends on the facts present in each case.309
The Board and courts evaluate additional indicia of good faith
when determining whether the sides have engaged in good faith
bargaining or surface bargaining. The proposals and demands
advanced by each side may be a factor.310 A proposal that one side
might consider totally unacceptable is not definitive indicia of the
other party’s absence of good faith. However, a proposal that is
clearly meant to frustrate the negotiation process or is plainly
unreasonable is evidence of bad faith.311
An employer’s
withdrawal of its sole proposal that includes existing conditions,
withdrawal of previously agreed-upon proposals, or substitution of
303

The employer’s initial proposal to one union was a nearly 50% wage reduction, to
which the union responded by saying it was “outlandish” and “that no union would agree
to [such demands].” Id.
304
Id.
305
271 N.L.R.B. 1600 (1984).
306
These factors include: (1) delaying tactics; (2) unreasonable bargaining demands; (3)
unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining; (4) efforts to bypass the union;
(5) failure to designate an agent with sufficient bargaining authority; (6) withdrawal of
already agreed-upon provisions; and (7) arbitrary scheduling of meetings. Id. at 1603.
307
Id.
308
Id.
309
HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 828; see also NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d
260, 264 (2d Cir. 1963).
310
HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 879.
311
See Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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new issues after the parties have reached an agreement is generally
considered evidence of a lack of good faith.312 An employer also
violates § 8(a)(5) if it unilaterally modifies mandatory subjects of
bargaining (wages, hours, working conditions).313
7. The Duty to Furnish Information
During negotiations, parties are required to furnish the other
side with additional information so as to understand each other’s
position. The Board has continually found that, in order to make
informed decisions and engage in effective bargaining, there exists
a duty to provide information.314 A refusal to furnish information
can severely impede the bargaining process. A refusal may also
change the characteristic of a strike from an economic strike to an
unfair labor practice strike.315 Because this is such an important
concept of labor law, one must understand when the duty to
provide information arises and what type of information must be
provided in those situations.
In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.,316 the employer
committed a ULP when it refused to supply the union with
information necessary to support its claim of not being able to
afford a wage increase.317 The union asked the employer to
provide evidence of its claim by allowing a certified public
accountant to examine the company’s books and financial data.318
The request was denied.319 In response to this refusal, the union
requested the company submit “full and complete information with
respect to its financial standing and profits” to verify its inability to
pay for a wage increase.320 Again the company refused.321 The
312

See generally HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 779–85.
Id. at 903.
314
See id. at 958–59.
315
Id. at 920.
316
351 U.S. 149 (1956).
317
See id. at 150 (stating that the employer claimed “it was undercapitalized, had never
paid dividends, and that an increase of more than two and one-half cents per hour would
put it out of business”).
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Id. at 150–51 (stating that the employer argued the information was not pertinent to
the negotiations and that the union had no legal right to the documents either).
313
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Board agreed with the union and ordered the company to provide
the union with information to “substantiate the Respondent’s
position.”322 After the court of appeals refused to enforce the
Board’s order, the union appealed to the United States Supreme
Court and eventually prevailed.
First, the Court set aside any question as to whether the request
to furnish information itself was overly burdensome on the
company because it never raised this point on appeal.323 The Court
concluded that both parties considered the ability to pay as “highly
relevant.”324 It also opined that claims made by either negotiating
party must be honest claims.325 Further,
If such an argument [made by a party] is important
enough to be present in the give and take of
bargaining, it is important enough to require some
sort of proof of its accuracy. And it would certainly
not be farfetched for a trier of fact to reach the
conclusion that bargaining lacks good faith when an
employer mechanically repeats a claim of inability
to pay without the slightest effort to substantiate the
claim.326
The Court then limited its holding:
We do not hold, however, that in every case [in]
which economic inability is raised as an argument
against increased wages it automatically follows
that the employees are entitled to substantiating
evidence. Each case must turn upon its particular
facts. The inquiry must be whether or not under the
circumstances of the particular case the statutory
obligation to bargain in good faith has been met.327

322
323
324
325
326
327

Id. at 151.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 152–53.
Id. at 153–54 (footnote omitted).
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This duty to furnish information extends during the life of the
contract and not just to negotiations between the parties.328 It also
extends to the union; such a request must be made in good faith.329
A good faith request means that the information must at least be
necessary and relevant to the relationship between the employer
and the union in its capacity as employee representative.330 If the
union request is considered too broad, the employer may request a
reasonable clarification from the union to demonstrate the
relevancy of the request, or the employer may comply with the
request to the extent it believes it must under the law.331 A
pertinent example of this concept is illustrated in Unbelievable,
Inc., where the court found that the request for information was
directly related to the question of substantial wage cuts.332 This
issue was essential to the union’s representation of its members.333
Future events may render a request for information moot.334
One such instance is where the employer no longer possesses the
duty to furnish information. However, if the information in
question could have aided the union in making a bargaining
decision, the duty to furnish is not rendered moot. An employer
may avoid the duty to disclose financial information by making it
unmistakably apparent to the union that the employer has
abandoned its position of financial instability.335 In determining
the validity of that defense, a court will examine the substance of
the employer’s bargaining position rather than the formal
statements it has made.336
Even if an employer presents partial information to the union
after initially denying such a request, an unfair labor practice may
still exist. In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB,337 such events took
328

HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 921.
See id. at 924–25 (citing Oakland Press Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 994 (1977), aff’d, 598
F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
330
HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 958.
331
Id. at 927.
332
See Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
333
See generally id.
334
HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 931.
335
Int’l Chem. Workers Union Council v. NLRB, 467 F.3d 742, 752 (9th Cir. 2006).
336
Id. at 749.
337
347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965).
329
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place.338 The union asked for certain lists of employees because of
concerns that the bargaining unit was slowly being
outnumbered.339 The employer first denied such requests, but after
the matter went to the Board, it provided some requested
information.340
The employer maintained that it had not
committed an unfair labor practice because it complied with the
request to furnish information.341 The Board and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed. The court held that the
Board’s analysis in the matter was no different than the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Truitt.342 The union had “successfully
demonstrated the relevance of the data it requested,” according to
the court.343 The requested information illustrated that the change
made in the composition of the out-of-bargaining-unit employees
was relevant as to the administration and policing of current
agreements as well as to the negotiation of future agreements.344
Although the parties eventually agreed to a contract, the
information would have been necessary and relevant to the
union.345
Furnishing information is paramount to the bargaining process.
The duty to provide information, when established to be relevant,
must be provided in a reasonable manner when this information is
available, and in such a way that does not impede the bargaining
process of the parties.346 The employer should avoid furnishing
information that contains deliberate inaccuracies or is incomplete,
but the information can be provided in a way no more extensive
than normal business practice dictates.347 Although an employer
may defend against this duty by alleging that compliance would be
too burdensome or expensive, this argument has been met with
338

See id. at 64–67.
Id. at 65.
340
Id. at 66.
341
Id.
342
Id. at 69. See generally NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 151 (1956).
343
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 347 F.2d at 69.
344
Id. at 70.
345
The information would have been useful in determining whether the union should
have utilized another means in changing the composition of the ratio between bargaining
and non-bargaining unit members. Id.
346
See Cincinnati Steel Casting Co. v. NLRB, 86 N.L.R.B. 592, 593 (1949).
347
See HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 940–41.
339
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little success.348 However, the employer does have other defenses
against such requests.
8. Employer Defenses
The duty to furnish information does not foreclose an employer
from alleging defenses. An employer may refuse to furnish certain
information under particular circumstances.349 In Detroit Edison
Co. v. NLRB,350 the Court was faced with the novel question of
whether an employer’s duty to provide relevant information
included the disclosure of tests and test scores achieved by named
employees in an employer administrated psychological aptitude
testing program.351 The union was processing a grievance to
arbitration and requested the company provide the psychological
aptitude testing program information.352 The employer replied that
it could release all but three items to the union: (1) the actual test
questions, (2) the actual employee answer sheets, and (3) the
scores linked with the names of the employees who received the
information.353 An arbitrator refused to grant the union’s demand
for the three items due to an outstanding unfair labor practice
charge against the employer.354
Eventually the employer provided the requested information.
The raw scores of those who had taken the test were disclosed with
the examinees’ names deleted. The company supplied the union
with sample test questions and with detailed information regarding
its scoring procedures.355 Finally, the company also offered to turn
over the scores of any employee who would sign a waiver
releasing the company psychologist from his confidentiality
pledge.356 The union declined to seek such releases.357

348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357

Id. at 941.
Id. at 943.
440 U.S. 301 (1979).
Id. at 304.
See id. at 307–08.
Id.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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While the employer won the grievance, the Board sided with
the union because the requested information was relevant and
necessary to its policing of the parties’ agreement.358 The ALJ
agreed with the company’s recommendation that a qualified
neutral psychologist be allowed to examine the information.
However, the Board and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit ordered all the information delivered to the union because
the union should be able to determine for itself if a psychologist
needed to review the test results.359
On appeal, the Supreme Court first addressed the Board’s
remedial action against the company, holding that this decision to
order all information to the union was incorrect.360 In light of the
company’s expense to prepare the questions, there were serious
concerns that such information, if handed over to the union, could
easily be disseminated to the membership.
This would
compromise the exam and could harm test takers whose scores
were lower than others.361 Specifically, the Court stated that no
particular policy supported the union’s position.362 Thus, it held
that the Board abused its discretion. The Court opined:
[a] union’s bare assertion that it needs information
to process a grievance does not automatically oblige
the employer to supply all the information in the
manner requested. The duty to supply information
under § 8 (a)(5) turns upon “the circumstances of
the particular case,” . . . and much the same may be
said for the type of disclosure that will satisfy that
duty.363
The Court also sided with the company on the ULP charges.364
First, it stated that there is not an absolute right to any relevant
information in light of the concerns for the confidentiality of the

358
359
360
361
362
363
364

Id. at 309.
Id.
Id. at 314–15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 315 (citing NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956)).
Id. at 317–20.
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psychologist and the individuals’ scores.365 No evidence existed
that the scores were protected to frustrate the union or serve some
other devious position.366 The Court then turned to the company’s
evidence that the prior release of scores had resulted in the
harassment of lower-scoring employees and illustrated that the
union’s demands paled in comparison with the company’s
concerns.367 The employer prevailed by providing more than just a
generalized contention that the requested information was
confidential, thereby meeting its burden of proof.
Combining Truitt and Detroit Edison, the duty to provide
information begins with the signing of the collective bargaining
agreement and continues for the life of the agreement to allow the
parties the ability to properly police their agreement.368 An
employer risks violating § 8(a)(5) by refusing to provide requested
information to a union if that information is necessary for the
union to properly discharge its duties as the bargaining
representative.369 An employer must furnish information if the
employer asserts a financial inability to grant the union’s demands.
9. Financial Information
There is a distinction between an inability to pay and a
competitive disadvantage, both of which are cited as concerns with
respect to requests for financial information. Financial information
is relevant and necessary in the context of an employer’s statement
that it cannot financially support the union’s demands for wages or
benefits.370 This proposition is illustrated in Truitt, as the Court
declared that good faith bargaining “requires that claims made by
either bargainer . . . be honest claims,” and this applies to claims
related to an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages.371

365

Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 318–19.
367
Id. at 319–20.
368
HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 958–59; see also Detroit Edison, 440 U.S. at 303;
Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152–53.
369
NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 217 F.2d 593, 594 (4th Cir. 1954).
370
HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 963.
371
Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152.
366
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Arguments of this nature must be supported through proof of its
accuracy.372
If a party is claiming an inability to pay, it must be willing to
support its contention with more than mere words.373 In the 2004
decision of AMF Trucking & Warehousing, Inc.,374 the Supreme
Court was forced to examine a company’s assertions made during
negotiations to determine whether it had effectively stated that the
employer could not pay for increases to the health insurance and
pension fund. The Board discussed the company’s response to
these requests in some detail:
The Respondent stated that the [u]nion was asking
for “pie in the sky,” that the Respondent had
purchased the Company “in distress a year and a
half earlier, and that the company was still in
distress.” The Respondent also said that it was
“fighting to [stay] alive,” and was “weaker this
year” than it had been in previous years.375
The Board concluded that the employer’s statements did not
meet the threshold test because the statements neither explicitly
stated that insufficient assets existed nor that such conditions
would cause the employer to go out of business by agreeing to the
union’s demands.376 The Board determined that the standard for
“inability to pay” denotes “that the company presently has
insufficient assets to pay or that it would have insufficient assets to
pay during the life of the contract that is being negotiated. Thus,
inability to pay is inextricably linked to nonsurvival in
business.”377
Furthermore, supplying financial information without allowing
the union an opportunity to directly examine company records
might be insufficient disclosure.378 However, an employer may set

372
373
374
375
376
377
378

See id. at 152–53.
In football parlance, that might be akin to “walking the walk and talking the talk.”
342 N.L.R.B. 1125 (2004).
Id. at 1125.
See id. at 1126–27.
Id. at 1125.
HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 965.
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parameters for the union to review and verify an employer’s
inability to pay.379
C. General Considerations
The collective bargaining process is based on several concepts,
most principally being the cooperative negotiation process. This is
founded upon the notions of mutual understanding and teamwork
between the bargaining parties. However, while both sides
endeavor to bargain in good faith in hopes of reaching a mutually
amicable settlement, each party may exert economic pressure upon
the other bargaining participant. These tools of economic pressure
include the lockout,380 the unfair practice strike,381 and the
economic strike.382 The use of each of these activities may
influence a bargaining party’s negotiation strategy and the
disclosure of information between the parties. These tools assist
the parties to bargain in good faith, which is the overall objective
of labor law.
While the duty to bargain does not require each side to engage
in marathon discussions, the parties must fully negotiate in good
faith. However, even if the parties bargain in good faith, an
impasse still may occur. This occurs when both sides are engaging
each other with a sincere intent to reach an agreement but cannot
find that necessary common ground to make such an accord. An
impasse is defined as the point in time during negotiations when
the parties are warranted in assuming that further bargaining would
379

NLRB v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 755 F.2d 260, 261 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that the
employer’s request was reasonably related to the audit, the qualifications were
appropriate, and the employer expressed willingness to discuss the qualifications, to
which the union was opposed).
380
See Am. Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 (stating “there is nothing in the
statute which would imply that the right to strike ‘carries with it’ the right exclusively to
determine the timing and duration of all work stoppages”).
381
In an unfair labor practice strike, strikers are to be reinstated to their former
positions upon the conclusion of the ULP strike. The employer must reinstate the
employee even if the organization had hired other workers during the strike. See NLRB v.
Int’l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50–51 (1972).
382
In an economic strike, an employer is able to freely fire and hire employees or
replacements and may, without fear of legal recourse, refuse requests for reinstatement
from a striker who was replaced during a strike. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,
304 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1938).

C08_LEVINE-MARAVENT_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1474

10/24/2010 1:03 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1419

be futile.383 To determine whether an impasse exists, one must
examine the totality of the circumstances384 and unique factors
surrounding the parties’ bargaining relationship.385 Upon reaching
this point, an employer may make unilateral changes in working
conditions so long as the changes had been offered to the union
during negotiations.386 In addition to the employer being able to
implement his last offer, the participants may also look to other
tools within labor law to assist in applying pressure to bring a
mutually agreeable resolution.387 Upon reaching an impasse, the
duty to bargain is not terminated. Instead, it is suspended and may
be reinstated upon the happening of a condition or circumstance
that renews the possibility of fruitful discussion amongst the
parties.388
V. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The bargaining between the NFL and NFLPA is increasingly
turning contentious. While some issues may raise less controversy
than others, it appears that both sides are having problems finding
common ground even on the less controversial non-economic
issues. For the purposes of the upcoming collective bargaining
process, and as articulated by Commissioner Goodell in his letter
to Mr. Upshaw, major issues include (1) addressing those financial
383

HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 989.
See id. at 989–95.
385
Unique factors include the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the
negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to which there is disagreement, and
the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations.
Additional factors may include whether there has been a strike or the union has consulted
the employees regarding this possibility, fluidity of the parties’ positions, continuation of
bargaining, statements or understandings of the parties concerning impasse, union animus
as evidenced by previous events, the bargaining history of the parties, the importance of
the issues and the extent of the difference or opposition amongst the parties, the parties
bargaining history, any willingness by the parties to further consider the issue, time
between bargaining sessions, and the number of bargaining sessions amongst the parties.
See id. at 990–95.
386
See generally NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (enumerating certain
circumstances that might justify unilateral employer action).
387
As mentioned above, these tools include the economic strike, ULP strike, and
lockout. See supra notes 380–82 and accompanying text.
388
See Gulf States Mfg. v. NLRB, 704 F.2d 1390, 1399 (5th Cir. 1983).
384
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issues that the League perceives as being obsolete in the current
NFL (the recalculation of League revenue as it applies to the salary
cap and team allocation of player salaries) and the considerations
as to whether the NFL has a duty to disclose its financial
information to the Union, (2) curbing rookie salaries through a
rookie wage scale and, to a certain extent, (3) addressing player
discipline issues. Taking the above-mentioned topics together, and
when considering the entire bargaining relationship between the
parties thus far, it is unclear whether the NFL is bargaining in good
faith.
A. The National Football League: The League Is Not Disclosing
Financial Information Because It Is Not Alleging an Inability
to Pay and Thus Is Bargaining in Good Faith389
The NFL is not going to provide any financial information to
the Union because it is not claiming an inability to pay.390 As
such, there is no duty to open League financial information for
review.391 Under the present CBA, Owners assume all of the risks
and the players reap the vast majority of the financial revenues.392
389

This viewpoint is portrayed by Jeffrey F. Levine.
Dennis Curran, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Football League,
Panel Address at the Sports Lawyers Conference (May 16, 2009); see also Smith
Addresses Industry Lawyers, NFL Executives, in Chicago, NFLPA.COM (May 19, 2009),
http://www.nflplayers.com/Articles/Public-News/Smith-Addresses-Industry-LawyersNFL-Executives-in-Chicago (“We are not claiming an inability to pay. We’re not going
to open our books. We don’t have to open our books.” (quoting Mr. Curren) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
391
See Smith Addresses Industry Lawyers, supra note 390.
392
Jim Corbett, NFL Owners Setting Priorities for CBA Negotiations, USA TODAY,
Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2009-03-23-ownerspriorities_N.htm [hereinafter Corbett, NFL Owners Setting Priorities]. Owners opted out
in May 2008 because the deal paid players nearly 60% of revenues. This large
percentage, coupled with rising operating costs, mounting stadium debt, and a tough
economy, caused NFL ownership to become more risk adverse. Thus, the NFL wants
players to assume more of their risk in regard to rising player costs. Commissioner
Goodell asserted that player costs increased by $500 million over 2008 and 2009, and
that “[t]he risk falls entirely on the clubs here. We have to make sure we address that
issue in a responsible fashion, including our partners.” The NFLPA responded by saying
that players take plenty of risk already, by playing in each game each week. Interview
with DeMaurice Smith, National Football League Players’ Association Executive
Director, SPORTING NEWS TODAY, Oct. 7, 2009, at 20, available at http://today.sporting
news.com/sportingnewstoday/20091007/?pg=20&pm=1&u1=friend#pg20.
390
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The NFL is the only sports league in which every team has a
player payroll in excess of $100 million; the average player salary
this year is $2 million plus an additional $300,000 per player in
benefits.393 This is all occurring in the greatest economic
downturn since the Great Depression. While the League can still
exist under these conditions, it is time to balance its financial risk
by working with the Union to create a new CBA that is
foundationally sound.
Ownership may have opted out of the 2006 CBA because this
accord altered how the NFL and its players divided League
revenues.394 After the 2006 CBA’s ratification, players received a
larger share of revenues. These revenues now include all stadium
revenues related to football.395 Under the current Agreement,
stadium revenues include concessions, parking, local advertising
and promotion, signage, magazine advertising, local sponsorship
agreements, stadium clubs, and luxury box income. All of these
revenue sources were excluded in prior CBAs.396 Thus, the current
CBA casts significant financial risk on Ownership by substantially
raising the likelihood of lucrative player salaries and also
artificially inflates the salary cap.
As a result of this increase in revenue being directed to player
salaries, the salary caps for each successive year are spiraling out
of control. Small market teams cannot keep up with the
burdensome costs forced upon them because of their comparatively
small consumer base.397 Small market teams are not as financially
well suited as large market teams to shoulder this financial
burden.398 Consequently, the relative inequities between the
NFL’s small market and large market teams exacerbate this player
salary issue.399 Although the League agreed to the current CBA
393
Leahy, supra note 14 (citing post from National Football League spokesman Greg
Aiello).
394
Deubert & Wong, supra note 43, at 181.
395
Id.
396
Id. (citing the NFL-CBA).
397
See Mark Curnutte, Financial Gap Widening Between NFL’s Haves and Have-Nots,
USA TODAY, Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2007-02-25financial-gap_x.htm.
398
Id.
399
Id.
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through good faith bargaining, allocating nearly 60% of League
revenues to player salaries and benefits through a mechanism that
was invented in 1993 is untenable. It is an obsolete manner of
operating the NFL. This obsolete system gives Ownership no
incentive to invest in the game.
The manner in which the NFL and the Union operated in 1993
is no longer valid. In the current economy, the Player’s
Association needs to be an equal partner in the League’s recovery
back to financial equilibrium. Although both sides have enjoyed a
tremendous period of growth since 1993, it is time for both labor
and management to make concessions for the betterment of
professional football. As steward of the game, the League is
consulting with every necessary party in hopes of setting a
foundation to ensure that the NFL will be as successful in the next
century as it was in the twentieth century. It is the League’s intent
to work with all necessary stakeholders to achieve cost certainty,
including with the Union.
1. The Disclosure of Financial Statements Is Not Necessary to
Understand the League’s Bargaining Position That the
Current CBA Is Obsolete
In regard to financial issues, the NFL did not opt out of the
2006 CBA because it was unable to pay the players. Instead, the
League opted out because this method of salary compensation is
obsolete.400 The current CBA’s salary calculation and distribution
is derived from a method that was created in 1993. Since then,
League revenues have gone up extensively due to monies derived
through the NFL’s stadium construction initiative and other
initiatives.401 Now, team salary commitments are unreasonably
inflated and are pushing player compensation into an unhealthy
realm. It is time to renegotiate the formula for salary cap
calculation.

400

See generally NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, supra note 183.
Judy Battista, In N.F.L.’s Labor Talks, the Rumblings of War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
2009, at SP7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/23/sports/football/
23labor.html.
401
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The NFL is bargaining in the best faith possible under the
circumstances. Ownership seeks to engage in sincere negotiations
with the Union to establish a system that fits the modern NFL
revenue generation model. The League will not release any
financial information because the Players’ Association knows the
figures;402 the Union also is keenly aware that the NFL’s largest
costs are player salaries, which were in excess of $4.5 billion for
the 2009 season.403 Further, Ownership is not under any obligation
to furnish information because the League has not stated that it is
unable to abide by the financial terms of the CBA. Despite this
fact, the Union continues to argue that the Owners do possess some
duty to disclose financial information to the NFLPA. However,
the duty to provide information under § 8(a)(5) does not turn on
the bare assertions of the Players’ Association.404 Instead, one
must examine the specific circumstances of this case.405 In other
words, the information must be necessary and relevant to the
bargaining relationship between the parties.406 Here, in addition to
the League not pleading an inability to pay, the Union already
knows this financial information. Thus, there is no duty to furnish
information.
One way in which the NFLPA could get a snapshot of League
financials would be to audit the corporate filings of the Green Bay
Packers. The Packers are a publicly owned entity and thus the
financial information is available. According to its financial
statements, the Packers earned $20.1 million in operating profits
during the 2008 season.407 This healthy profit substantiates the
League’s argument that it did not opt out of the CBA because of
financial inability. Since the profits of the Packers act as a
bellwether reading into the financial health of the NFL as a whole,

402

Tom Curran, Goodell on Work Stoppage, NFL INSIDER REP. (Mar. 23, 2009),
http://blogs.nbcsports.com/home/archives/2009/03/goodell-on-work-stoppage.html
(quoting Commissioner Goodell).
403
Id.
404
See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979) (citing NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956)).
405
See id. at 314 (citing Truitt, 351 U.S. at 153).
406
See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1966).
407
Brown & Prine, supra note 203.
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the League has no obligation to furnish financial information to the
Union.408
The NFL seeks to bargain with the NFLPA and come to an
agreement ensuring that there will not be a work stoppage. The
League is focusing on its priorities in the collective bargaining
process, achieving cost certainty, and working with the Union to
reach an agreement.409 There is no need to engage in a “lock-in”410
or create artificial deadlines, as these will obstruct the natural
development of negotiations between the parties. At this point, the
League has instructed franchises to take preparatory measures for a
possible work stoppage because this is prudent. One needs
revenue in order to run a league; this is why signing deals such as
the one with DirecTV411 was paramount regardless of whether or
not there is a labor stoppage. While the parties are seeking to
come to an accord, one must also prepare to face the potential
scenario where football will not be played. Thus, cost containment
is an important element to the NFL’s success.
2. Cost Containment Includes a True Rookie Wage Scale and
Modifying Player Discipline Mechanisms
One element of cost containment paramount to establishing a
solid financial foundation is the curbing of excess and unnecessary
costs. The most effective method to effectuate this change is
through regulating rookie compensation.412 Both management and
the Union must work together to curb rising salaries for those
players that were selected in the early portion of the NFL Draft.
The simple and most obvious way to rein in over-inflated rookie
salaries is through the implementation of a rookie salary cap.
The League is proposing that a rookie wage scale and a
mechanism that credits against NFL club owners’ expenses be
408

See Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152.
Corbett, NFL Owners Setting Priorities, supra note 392.
410
Mullen, NFL Rejects Players’, supra note 208.
411
See Matthew Futterman, NFL, DirecTV Extend Pact in $4 Billion Deal, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 24, 2009, at B5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12378650349
0122053.html.
412
Goodell: Rookie Pay Scale ‘Ridiculous,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 3, 2008,
available at http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80909cc9&template=withvideo&confirm=true.
409
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implemented into the new CBA.413 Under this proposal, these
expenses will be deducted from revenues that determine the NFL
salary cap, thereby providing a cost savings.414 It is in the best
interests of the game and all of those involved to insert into the
CBA cost containment mechanisms. One only needs to look at
such mechanisms and how they helped restore the vitality of
professional hockey after the NHL lockout.415 Therefore, it is
paramount to include the proper mechanisms in the new CBA to
stop the absurd escalation of salaries for unproven rookie
players.416
In addition, League franchises must possess the ability to
recover the significant money that each organization invests in
players as signing bonuses if that individual breaches his contract
or refuses to perform. This issue is complicated by the fact that
grievances such as these are overseen by a judge who is overtly
biased toward the Union.417 Pursuant to the 1993 consent decree,
all labor-related issues between the parties fall under the
supervision of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota.418 While Judge Doty’s court has resolved disputes
over the terms of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement and the
parallel CBA over the last sixteen years, he is no longer
impartial.419 A prime example illustrating both the League’s
inability to recover signing bonuses from players who breach and
Judge Doty’s bias is the events surrounding the incarceration of
Michael Vick.
After signing a contract that made him the highest paid player
in the NFL, which included a $20 million signing bonus, Vick was
indicted on charges stemming from his financing of a dog-fighting
413

NFL Presents Economic Proposal for New CBA to NFLPA, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/index.cfm?
fuseaction=sbd.main&ArticleID=134723.
414
Id.
415
Michael K. Ozanian & Kurt Badenhausen, NFL on the Rebound, FORBES.COM, Nov.
9, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/09/nhl-teams-owners-biz_06nhl_cz_mo_kb_
1109nhlintro.html.
416
Goodell: Rookie Pay Scale ‘Ridiculous,’ supra note 412.
417
See generally White v. Nat’l Football League, 585 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 2009).
418
Id. at 1133.
419
Id.

C08_LEVINE-MARAVENT_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

10/24/2010 1:03 PM

SPORTS LAW FORUM: FUMBLING AWAY THE SEASON

1481

ring.420 On August 27, 2007, Vick pled guilty to the charges and
was sentenced to nearly two years in federal prison.421
Commissioner Goodell suspended Vick indefinitely without pay
shortly thereafter.422 The NFL also initiated a non-injury grievance
procedure on behalf of the Atlanta Falcons, Vick’s former team, in
order to recuperate part of the $19.97 million in roster and signing
bonuses the franchise had paid Vick, as he was still under contract
with the team until 2014.423 Pursuant to the Consent Agreement
and CBA, a Special Master presided over a hearing to determine
whether Vick had to give the money back. Special Master
Burbank ruled in favor of the Falcons, determining that Vick
needed to repay the bonus money.424 Vick appealed to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota, where Judge Doty
reversed the Special Master’s ruling. The court ruled that Vick had
already earned his bonus prior to his indefinite suspension.425 The
League appealed, but the district court’s decision was upheld. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that based on the language
used in the CBA, Vick’s bonus was fully earned prior to his legal
problems.426
Although Vick seemingly violated the terms of his contract, he
was still able to keep the vast majority of his signing bonus. The
League and the Union must remedy the anti-forfeiture provision in
the CBA that the arbiters relied upon. Changing this term will
allow franchises to recover funds from a player who breaches his
contract or engages in conduct that is contrary to the best interests
of football.427 This would free up money to compensate players
who actually perform pursuant to or outperform their contracts.
Both the district court and the appellate court misinterpreted the
420

Michael S. Schmidt, Vick Pleads Guilty in Dog-Fighting Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/27/sports/football/27cnd-vick.html.
421
Id.
422
Id.
423
Deubert & Wong, supra note 43, at 220–21.
424
“The Special Master is an arbitrator that has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
arising out of a wide range of articles in the CBA. . . . As of 2009, the current Special
Master is University of Pennsylvania Law School professor Richard Burbank.” Id. at 203.
425
White v. Nat’l Football League, 533 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (D. Minn. 2008), aff’d,
585 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 2009).
426
White v. Nat’l Football League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1143 (8th Cir. 2009).
427
White, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
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relevant provisions within the CBA; thus, the parties must change
this provision so that it unequivocally protects franchises that are
injured by non-performing or breaching players and enables other
players to receive that money being forfeited.
The parties must also agree to extricate themselves from the
supervision of Judge Doty. Throughout the latter portions of this
CBA’s life, Judge Doty has demonstrated overt bias toward the
Union through his comments about the bargaining process between
the parties during the last twenty years.428 It is time to end the
unnecessary dependence on the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota and instead work with all necessary stakeholders to
establish a new foundation that will mutually benefit all parties
involved. The League is confident that the NFL and the Union can
continue to bargain in good faith without the unduly burdensome
oversight of any court.
3. The System Needs to Change
It is clear that major provisions of this Agreement are obsolete.
The NFL needs to work with all stakeholders to chart a new
strategy so that the next century of professional football is as
successful as the last decade. However, a new strategy must be
negotiated that equally distributes risk amongst the parties and
bargaining must occur free from the supervision of a biased
referee. Although the NFLPA alleges that the current system is
mutually beneficial, this statement is erroneous and disingenuous.
In fact, the system is broken.
With each passing year, the disparity between large market and
small market clubs continues to widen.429 The chief constraint on
428

Judge Doty stated that the
[NFL Owners] pretend they’re getting beaten around. Well, they did,
initially, but they had a position that was not legally sound. . . . I
think if you ask Tagliabue, he would say, “The whole thing has come
out our way.” Because, even though they complain about it . . . all
they’ve done is make tons of money.
White, 585 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Jay Weiner, NFL’s Toughest Official Wields a Gavel,
Not a Whistle, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS J., Jan. 28, 2008, at 8, available at
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/57905 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
429
Brian Karpuk, Will There Be an NFL Lockout in 2011?, NEWSBURGLAR (June 3,
2009), http://newsburglar.com/2009/06/03/will-there-be-an-nfl-lockout-in-2011.
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each club’s finances is the enormous cost that player salaries
embody.430 To this end, major stakeholders must work together to
implement a system that curbs the NFL’s largest costs: player
salaries.431 Thus, a rookie salary cap will do much to ease the
trend of skyrocketing rookie salaries, especially those taken in the
early portions of the first round. In the meantime, the NFL must
continue to find new ways to offset its substantial costs. While the
NFL has negotiated deals that guarantee that revenues will be
received in the event of a labor stoppage, any sort of disruption of
games is contrary to the best interests of the game. The League
has presented substantial reasons for its position to the Union and
is negotiating in good faith. Thus, the NFL is and has been
bargaining in the best faith possible under the circumstances and
therefore did not engage in any unfair labor practices.
B. The National Football League Players Association: The
National Football League Is Not Bargaining in Good Faith432
Ever since the Owners unanimously voted on May 20, 2008 to
opt out of the current CBA, the Union has repeatedly asked for the
rationale of this decision.433 The League’s continued response is
that this deal is not affording all clubs a chance to be competitive.
As professional football is a multi-billion dollar enterprise, it is
difficult without viewing the NFL’s financial information to
understand exactly how this current Agreement fails to foster
competitiveness amongst the thirty-two franchises. Since the 2006
season, the most recent year the CBA was extended, eight different
teams have appeared in the Super Bowl.434 The financial state of
the League has never been healthier. There is no reason to change
any element of the current financial structure without tangible

430
Larry Weisman, NFL Salaries ’08: Big Ben Smiling as Highest-Paid Player, USA
TODAY, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2008-11-05salaries_N.htm; see also NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, supra note 183.
431
NFL Owners Meetings: Work Stoppage Unlikely After CBA Opt-Out, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, May 21, 2008, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.
com/article/121029.
432
This viewpoint is portrayed by Bram Maravent.
433
NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, supra note 183.
434
Superbowl History, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/superbowl/history (last visited Feb.
25, 2010).
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evidence; mere words do not suffice. The Union has presented its
impression of the League’s financial health in economic reports
that were quickly rebuffed by management. The only justification
the Union keeps hearing from Ownership is that the current deal is
not financially workable. Facts prove otherwise: teams are
shelling out big money on player contracts and, from an overall
perspective, multiple television deals are already signed, sealed,
and delivered to the League’s coffers that guarantee payment even
in the event of a strike or lockout. If this is the case, then the
natural train of thought is to have Ownership demonstrate why this
current CBA is not financially viable. As Ownership is unwilling
to provide any financial information despite the Union’s repeated
attempts to request and obtain these figures, the League is not
bargaining in good faith.
1. The Disclosure of Financial Statements Is Vital to
Understanding the League’s Bargaining Position
Ownership unanimously opted out of the 2006–12 CBA in
May 2008. In doing so, the League released, in part, this
statement:
A collective bargaining agreement has to work
for both sides.
If the agreement provides
inadequate incentives to invest in the future, it will
not work for management or labor. And, in the
context of a professional sports league, if the
agreement does not afford all clubs an opportunity
to be competitive, the [L]eague can lose its appeal.
The NFL earns very substantial revenues. But
the clubs are obligated by the CBA to spend
substantially more than half their revenues—almost
$4.5 billion this year alone—on player costs. In
addition, as we have explained to the [U]nion, the
clubs must spend significant and growing amounts
on
stadium
construction,
operations
and
improvements to respond to the interests and
demands of our fans. The current labor agreement
does not adequately recognize the costs of
generating the revenues of which the players
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receive the largest share; nor does the [A]greement
recognize that those costs have increased
substantially—and at an ever increasing rate—in
recent years during a difficult economic climate in
our country. As a result, under the terms of the
current agreement, the clubs’ incentive to invest in
the game is threatened.435
A CBA has to work for both sides. The NFLPA is not
disagreeing with this statement, but disagrees with Ownership’s
declaration that costs are too high.436 This assertion must be
supported by some kind of proof. The League insists that the
Union has this information; some have stated off the record that
these documents are protected by a strict confidentiality
agreement, and as such are not available to the public. The
League’s thirty-two teams have refused to provide financial data to
support their collective cry that they are not earning enough to
afford their labor costs.437
The NFLPA possesses some financial information as each
year’s salary cap is based on the League’s yearly total revenue.
The NFLPA also has access to the Green Bay Packers’ financial
data.438 Because the Packers are publicly owned, this information
was publicly available and used by economists Kevin M. Murphy
and Robert H. Topel, who issued The Economics of NFL Team
Ownership, which was distributed by the NFLPA to the Owners
prior to the January 2009 Super Bowl.439 The study also compiled
the League’s financial information, as it was provided to the
authors by the NFLPA.440
The results were astounding. The Packers’ revenue, when
compared against the estimates of Forbes magazine (just under
435

NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, supra note 183.
NFL Leader Says Lockout Almost Certain, NBCSPORTS.COM, Feb. 4, 2010,
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/35247167/ns/sports-nfl/.
437
MURPHY & TOPEL, supra note 12, at 1.
438
Id.
439
See, e.g., Rick Maese, This One Could Get Ugly, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 31, 2009,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-01-31/sports/0901300188_1_nfl-commissionerroger-goodell-ravens-owner-steve-bisciotti-raymond-james-stadium (noting that the
Union “paraded around” this report).
440
MURPHY & TOPEL, supra note 12, at 3.
436
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$250 million), was slightly higher.441 The report noted that “the
Green Bay Packers have been approximately in the middle of all
NFL teams in financial performance as reported by Forbes
indicating that the team is not an outlier.”442 Player costs and
operating income were also similar.443
The NFL’s revenue, when the economists considered the
Union’s data against the data of Forbes, was also higher.444 Player
costs were the same ($4 billion).445 According to the study,
estimated team values have risen from $288.1 million to $1.04
billion since the 1998 CBA extension; these figures were
supported by data from the sales of seven NFL franchises since
1998.446 Most recently, the economists used the December 2008
sale of the Miami Dolphins to New York real estate billionaire
Stephen Ross as proof that the current economic problems that
many businesses encounter are not affecting the value of NFL
franchises.447
The study also discussed one of the League’s reasons for
renegotiating the current CBA—that the teams are carrying too
much debt. To examine this statement, the economists utilized the
average ratio of total debt to team equity value and the ratio of
average total debt to average team equity value.448 Total debt has
actually decreased since the 1998 CBA extension, and total debt
has increased slower than team value.449 Thus, as the economists
expressed, “debt is less of an issue for NFL teams now than it has
been in the past.”450 When taking into account both team value
and operating income, the study states that between 2000 and
2008, the average return for an NFL owner is between “$49
million and $131 million per year depending on the year, with
441

Id. at 4.
Id. at 4 n.3.
443
Id. at 5–6.
444
Id. at 6 (noting that the Union reported the NFL’s revenue as over $7 billion
compared to $6.5 billion as estimated by Forbes).
445
Id.
446
Id. at 8–9.
447
Id. at 10.
448
Id. at 12.
449
Id.
450
Id.
442
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average financial returns in recent years that have typically
exceeded $100 million per year,” proving that NFL team
ownership is not a losing proposition.451
Only one team, according to the report (citing Forbes), had an
operating loss over the last five years.452 The Detroit Lions had a
net operating loss of $3.1 million in 2008, according to Forbes.453
Because of this information, Professor Murphy and Professor
Topel concluded “it is difficult to make a case that the owners are
not earning enough to pay the players what they are due to make
under the current CBA.”454 Regarding player salaries, the study
found that the current salary cap and free agency system in place
has only brought the players’ percentage of salaries to a level near
the overall average since 1994, and that reducing salaries, as has
been suggested by Ownership, would reduce players’ salaries to a
level below the historical average since the 1994 CBA.455 The
Agreement has a ceiling, and therefore, the salary cap and player
benefits cannot be more than 61.68% of projected revenues in any
year; this provides “a substantial cushion” for Ownership.456 In
sum, team values have quadrupled over the last decade and
franchises made on average $25 million last year; these figures are
a far cry from a system in need of significant change.457
In response to this report, NFL Commissioner Goodell stated,
There’s a lot of fiction in that report. . . . The
[U]nion has very in-depth knowledge of our
economics and they also know our largest cost is
player costs. What’s happened is the system has
changed and the environment has changed. . . . The

451

Id. at 13.
Id.
453
Id.
454
Id. at 14.
455
Id. at 14–15.
456
Id. at 15.
457
Aaron Kuriloff, NFL Lockout Would Cost Owners $15.5 Billion, Union Lawyer
Says, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601079&sid=asJ1X9A8a.LI&refer=home.
452
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model has shifted over the years and we will
address that in negotiations.458
NFLPA Executive Director Smith has sent a letter to
Commissioner Goodell asking for a more detailed explanation of
the Owners’ decision to opt out of the Agreement and has made
repeated requests for financial information.459
Smith also
demanded that the NFL “turn over all audited financial statements
[and] profit-loss information” to the Union.460 Despite these goodfaith demands, Goodell refuses to release this financial
information, alleging that the Union “‘knows our revenue down to
almost a penny’ because of revenue figures used to compute the
[L]eague’s salary cap.”461 Goodell’s statements are fraught with
the idea that the current economics of the deal are not working.
However, the NFL will not provide financial statements to support
its contention because the Union knows only one figure: that
nearly 60% of League revenues must be spent on player salaries
and benefits.462
The League has postured in many ways that might indicate
poor financial health, such as staff layoffs and allowing teams to
opt out of the League-run pension, retirement, and 401(k) plans for
club employees.463 However, after repeated requests, no tangible

458

Associated Press, Goodell: Union Report Inaccurate, ESPN.COM, Jan. 30, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=3872330&type=story.
459
Liz Mullen, NFLPA’s Smith Sends Letter to Goodell Asking About CBA Opt Out,
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, May 19, 2009, http://www.sports
businessdaily.com/article/130321 [hereinafter Mullen, NFLPA’s Smith Sends Letter]; see
also Mike Florio, Union Poses 10 Questions to NFL, NBC SPORTS, Mar. 25, 2010,
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/03/25/union-poses-10-questions-to-nfl
[hereinafter Florio, Union Poses].
460
Alex Marvez, ‘New Players’ Union Head Begins Posturing, FOX SPORTS, May 18,
2009,
http://msn.foxsports.com/nfl/story/9586506/New-players’-union-head-beginsposturing.
461
Id.
462
See Sportsdoc, The Plight of Former National Football League Players Heads Back
to the Senate, SPORTS BUS. NEWS (Sept. 19, 2007, 12:10 AM), http://sportsbiznews.
blogspot.com/2007/09/plight-of-former-national-football.html. See generally Liz Mullen,
Union Economist: NFL Numbers Don’t Add Up, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS J.,
Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/64542.
463
Daniel Kaplan & Liz Mullen, NFL Owners OK Opt-Out of Pension Plans, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS J., Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/
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information has been delivered to the Union to support
Ownership’s contention that the current economic structure is not
working.464
Under the precedent of Truitt, a request for
information must be made in good faith; thus, it must at least be a
request for necessary and relevant information crucial to the
relationship between the employer and the union in its capacity as
employee representative.465 Surely financial information is both
necessary and relevant insofar as determining how the current
economic structure is or is not working. This is not a situation like
Detroit Edison where the information would be considered a trade
secret or harmful to the employees.466 In AMF Trucking, the
Board stated that an inability to pay means that an employer does
not have the money to pay now or for the life of the contract the
current wage and benefit terms in place.467 The League insists that
all of its clubs will not continue to remain competitive if the
current economic structure exists and that the clubs’ incentive to
invest in the game is threatened. The League must provide
financial information to the extent it can support these statements.
As the League has not provided this information, and because it is
the party that opted out of the Agreement, the League is not
bargaining in good faith.
2. A Rookie Wage Scale Already Exists
Another reason Ownership opted out of the current CBA is that
it feels that the current salaries for rookies are too high and is thus
seeking a rookie salary cap. However, a rookie wage scale already
exists in the form of a rookie wage pool,468 and it is up to the teams
to spend their money properly. Second, the share of rookie salaries
is wrongly considered by the League from a cumulative

article/62186; NFL Chief Takes Pay Cut After Layoffs, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 25, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/25/news/newsmakers/nfl_commissioner/index.htm.
464
See Mullen, NFLPA’s Smith Sends Letter, supra note 459.
465
See generally NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); see also HIGGINS,
supra note 251, at 958.
466
See generally Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
467
See AMF Trucking & Warehousing, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 1125, 1126 (2004).
468
Mike Florio, 2009 Rookie Pool Numbers Are Released, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Apr.
28, 2009), http://www.profootballtalk.com/2009/04/28/2009-rookie-pool-numbers-arereleased [hereinafter Florio, 2009 Rookie Pool Numbers].
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perspective. Third, rookies do not take money away from veteran
players. Thus, because there are already mechanisms in place to
address the situation, there is no need to bargain over the issue.
The NFL allocates a maximum cap value to each of its thirtytwo teams that may be devoted to all of a team’s draft picks. This
amount is based upon the number of draft picks, the round the
player is selected, and the overall spot within the round in which
the picks are made.469 This wage pool provides teams with a limit
on the amount of money in base salaries they can allocate toward
rookie salaries each year. A rookie wage scale would establish
rigid and restrictive guidelines for rookie salaries based on where
players are drafted. A number would essentially be earmarked for
players depending upon where they were drafted without
exception. The current system, however, is based on the teams’
salary cap figure, and rookie salaries amount to around 4% of all
franchise salaries.470 The only difference between the current
system and a wage scale is the assigning of a particular number to
the slot to which each player is drafted.
One reason the League is pushing the notion that a rookie wage
scale is necessary is that such a system would shift the blame from
the team to the player. Under a wage scale, the player cannot be
upset with a set salary, only with the team that drafted him or the
spot where he was drafted.471 A slotting system, such as the one
within the National Basketball Association, would take any
negotiating leverage away from the player and his team.472
Additionally, the League is trying to drive a wedge between
rookies and veterans.473 The veterans, however, should be more
upset with Owners who continue to perpetrate this massive
financial feeding frenzy that has become the top half of the first

469

Id.
Dan Graziano, Crabtree Aside, NFL Doesn’t Need a Rookie Wage Scale, NFL
FANHOUSE (Aug. 17, 2009), http://nfl.fanhouse.com/2009/08/17/crabtree-aside-nfldoesnt-need-a-rookie-wage-scale [hereinafter Graziano, Crabtree Aside].
471
Id.
472
Id.
473
Id.
470
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round of the NFL Draft. The Union has no control over the money
teams choose to spend on bonuses to rookies.474
The argument that veteran players are harmed by the current
system is also misguided. After the wage pool money is allotted,
which amounts to 4% of the total salary cap, there is 96% of the
salary cap pie available to veteran players.475 The economists
commissioned by the NFLPA to study NFL financials stated that
Ownership’s argument that teams are paying more for rookies than
for veterans is “without merit.”476 Furthermore, “the average
rookie pool has declined relative to the per team salary cap from
approximately seven percent in 1994 to just under four percent in
2008.”477
Ownership argues that wages at the top of the draft (i.e.,
players chosen in the top half of the first round) are growing at an
increasingly disproportionate rate.478 Additionally, others argue
that those teams in need of the most help are actually penalized by
the draft, as those teams must surrender large amounts of money to
unproven players.479 Critics of these large contracts argue that
perhaps the immediate riches these agreements afford create
troublesome and disruptive players.480 Some veteran players have
even spoken out against the current system.481 However, none of
these critics have pointed to any information more tangible than
the data provided by the economists commissioned by the Union.
The truth of the matter is negotiating salaries is part of the business
of football. It is also true that the average career of an NFL player
might be less than a few seasons.482 Ownership and the Union
474

See id.
MURPHY & TOPEL, supra note 12, at 16.
476
Id.
477
Id.; see also Mike Florio, 2009 Rookie Pool Numbers, supra note 468.
478
Mike Florio, The Case for a True Rookie Wage Scale, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (May
19, 2009), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/05/19/the-case-for-a-true-rookiewage-scale.
479
Id.
480
Id.
481
Mike Florio, Lorenzo Neal Doesn’t Like the Current Rookie Pay System, PRO
FOOTBALL TALK (May 11, 2009), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/05/11/
lorenzo-neal-doesnt-like-the-current-rookie-pay-system.
482
NFL Hopeful FAQs, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflplayers.com/aboutus/FAQs/NFL-Hopeful-FAQs (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
475
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have already negotiated a rookie salary cap.483 A rookie does not
possess much bargaining power because one way or another, the
team can only pay its rookies what it is allotted by the League.484
After the small percentage from the rookie wage pool is paid, a
large amount of money is available under the cap to sign veteran
players.485 Any complaints veteran players may have should be
taken to their respective teams for not doling out the remainder of
the allotted salary cap money to players.486 Veterans might not
want to do that though, as a rookie salary may also inflate the
market for veterans.487
It is widely acknowledged that the League will implement a
rookie wage scale as a means to divide rookies and veterans.488
However, if the above-commissioned NFLPA report is taken under
proper consideration,489 there is no reason for an intra-union
dispute. The real issue is whether the League can police Owners
and front office personnel into drafting better, selecting smarter,
and paying veteran players the entire remainder of the available
space allotted to them under the salary cap.
3. The League’s Pockets Keep Getting Deeper
As discussed thus far, player salaries and benefits consist of
roughly 60% of total League revenue.490 The CBA used to only
include “Defined Gross Revenues,” which included a limited
group of sources, but did include national television contracts,
ticket sales, and NFL merchandise sales. Ownership’s argument
that it does not have a system that can financially work for players
and Owners does not hold water when considering all of the
revenue generated by advertising sales (which the players help
generate as the end product of the game of football) and television
483

See Graziano, Crabtree Aside, supra note 470.
Id.
485
Mike Florio, The Case Against a True Wage Scale, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (May 26,
2009),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/05/26/the-case-against-a-true-rookiewage-scale [hereinafter Florio, The Case Against].
486
Id.
487
Id.
488
Graziano, Crabtree Aside, supra note 470.
489
Notably, the NFL has not provided data against this report.
490
MURPHY & TOPEL, supra note 12, at 12.
484
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money, which is not contingent on a strike-free year or a
lockout.491
Companies spent a total of $2.616 billion on television
advertising during the 2008 NFL season, which includes the
regular season, playoffs, and Super Bowl.492 The NFL average
ticket price has risen in the last year, up 4% to $75, despite the
efforts of twenty-one of the League’s thirty-two teams to cut or
sustain ticket prices this season.493 Only three of the NFL’s thirtytwo teams did not attempt a new advertising push or cut ticket
prices this season.494 While teams are facing economic problems
at the gate,495 these issues do not exist with the League’s television
contracts.496
The NFL and DirecTV signed a deal that sends $1 billion to the
League every year, whether or not a game is played in 2011, the
year when a strike or lockout might take place.497 Some have
called this provision “lockout insurance.”498 In other words, the
League has a strike fund in place, and a much bigger one than the
Union has tried to accumulate. The League also has enough
money to wait for the deal it wants, instead of being under

491

See generally id.
NFL TV Advertisers Spent $2.6B Last Season, Led by A-B, U.S. Gov’t, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.
com/article/133374.
493
Larry Weisman, NFL Blitz: Ticket Prices and the Fan Cost Index, REDSKINS.COM
(Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.redskins.com/gen/articles/NFL_Blitz__Holding_the_Line_
On_Ticket_Prices_51755.jsp.
494
Daniel Kaplan, Tough Ticket Market Forces NFL Teams to Be Creative, SPORTING
NEWS TODAY, Sept. 10, 2009, at 11, available at http://today.sportingnews.
com/sportingnewstoday/20090910/?pg=11&pm=1&u1=friend&sub_id=WKoP0PTTLltA
#pg11.
495
Daniel Kaplan, Up to 12 NFL Teams May Face Blackouts, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS J., Aug. 31, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/63444.
496
Maury Brown, At Midseason, NFL TV Ratings Exceptionally Strong, BIZ OF
FOOTBALL (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.bizoffootball.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=575:at-midseason-nfl-tv-ratings-exceptionally-strong&catid
=40:television&Itemid=57.
497
Peter King, DirecTV Deal Is Lockout Insurance, SI.COM, Mar. 24, 2009,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/peter_king/03/24/meetings/index.html.
498
See id. But see Mike Florio, DirecTV “Guarantee” Would Likely Reduce Future
Payments, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Mar. 24, 2009), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2009/03/directv-guarantee-would-likely-reduce-future-payments.php.
492

C08_LEVINE-MARAVENT_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1494

10/24/2010 1:03 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1419

financial pressure to take any deal offered by the Union.499 During
the last NFL strike, which occurred in 1987, the television
networks dealt with replacement player games and scheduled
alternative programming to fill the void.500 A strike in 2011 could
exhibit similar problems. The NFL has already signed deals
extending its current television partnerships with FOX and CBS.501
But for Ownership, it can just sit back and continue to count the
money rolling in, even if ticket revenue might be down.
Additionally, the League is engaging in behavior that it shied
away from in previous years, such as advertising on player practice
jerseys and signing deals with lotteries.502 Owners now also
schedule events at their venues, from concerts to college football
games, for additional revenue.503 The League also has the NFL
Network and the Red Zone Channel, which provide additional
cable revenue and advertising dollars.504 The NFL Network even
broadcasts some NFL regular season games. This is on top of the
already-existing television relationships the League has with NBC,
CBS, FOX, and ESPN, which paid each team close to $94 million
last year alone.505 If all other shared national revenue is included
in this figure, which includes road-game receipts and other leaguewide source revenues, each NFL team made about $147 million in
499

See NFL Team Valuations, FORBES.COM, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/
lists/2009/30/football-values-09_NFL-Team-Valuations_Value.html.
500
Clare Farnsworth, NFL Crossed the Line on Replacement Sunday, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Oct. 4, 2002, http://www.seattlepi.com/football/89817_replace04.shtml.
501
Associated Press, NFL Inks Broadcast Deals with CBS, FOX, CRAIN’S N.Y.
BUSINESS.COM, May 19, 2009, http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20090519/
FREE/905199972.
502
See Packers Possibly Looking to Sell Ad Space on Practice Jerseys, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, June 4, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
article/130699; see also Chad Millman, The NFL Isn’t a Hypocritical League on
Gambling, It Just Lacks Serious Vision, ESPN.COM, May 28, 2009, http://sports.espn.
go.com/espnmag/story?id=4211465.
503
See, e.g., Events Scheduled for Cowboy Stadium in Arlington, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 18, 2009, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/
cowboysstadium/stories/000000dnspocowboysstadiumevents.1d084b10.html.
504
See Press Release, DirecTV, NFL and DirecTV Extend NFL Sunday Ticket
Agreement
Through
2014
Season
(Mar.
23,
2009),
available
at
http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/global/article.jsp?assetId=P5590122.
505
Kurt Badenhausen, Michael K. Ozanian & Christina Settimi, Recession Tackles NFL
Team Values, FORBES.COM, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/02/nfl-profootball-business-sportsmoney-football-values-09-values.html.
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2008.506 With so much money in its collective hands, Ownership
has neither any worries of economic failure nor of the effect of a
work stoppage.
The NFL is immensely popular and profitable for all sides
involved. “According to the Nielsen ratings, in 2008, five of the
top 10 single-event television broadcasts were NFL-related.
Because of this, television networks pay a premium for NFL
content.”507 However, one must remember that players have to be
playing in these contests in order for virtually all involved to enjoy
those immense benefits. Ownership, on the other hand, is the only
outlier. Under the above-mentioned contracts, the NFL is
guaranteed some return even in the event of a strike or lockout
because of these television contracts and other business
ventures.508 These lucrative contracts give the League another
reason to drag along negotiations as long as possible. The longer
negotiations take, the more pressure is on the Union to agree to a
deal or face the prospect of losing part of a revenue sharing
arrangement. Since a deal was not reached between the NFL and
the Union before March of 2010, the players will only enjoy
whatever percentage of the salary “pie” they can get, as there will
be no salary cap for the 2010 season. The NFLPA will likely look
to legal action to see that this “lockout insurance” is used for the
common good of both sides.509 This may reduce the likelihood of
a labor stoppage.510

506
Don Walker, Packers’ Net Profit: $5.2 Million, J. SENTINEL (Milwaukee, Wis.), July
14, 2010, http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/sports/98421189.html.
507
Fisher, supra note 223.
508
King, supra note 497.
509
Sean Leahy, NFLPA Asks Arbitrator to Put NFL’s TV Money in Escrow in Event of
2011 Lockout, USA TODAY, June 9, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
thehuddle/post/2010/06/nflpa-asks-arbitrator-to-put-nfls-tv-money-in-escrow-in-event-of2011-lockout/1; David Elfin, NFLPA Files Complaint over League’s Guaranteed TV
Deals, NFLPLAYERS.COM (June 9, 2009), http://www.nflplayers.com/articles/cbanews/nflpa-files-complaint-over-leagues-guaranteed-tv-deals.
510
Sean Leahy, Analyst: NFLPA’s TV Complaint ‘Probably Reduces the Probability of
a Lockout,’ USA TODAY, June 10, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/the
huddle/post/2010/06/analyst-nflpas-tv-complaint-probably-reduces-the-probability-of-alockout/1.
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Ownership has taken the position that the current financial
structure does not work.511 However, when presented with the
very same information that the League says the Union has as part
of its commissioned economic report, it called it “fiction.”512 The
Union has in turn asked for audited financial statements of the
NFL’s thirty-two teams to determine what, if any, part of the
current financial structure is not working.513 The League has
refused any such request.514 The NFL’s position regarding a
rookie wage scale is purely based on an interest to remove any
bargaining power from the top-tier rookies and to displace the
solidarity of the Union.515 A pool of money is already set aside for
rookies and has no effect on veteran salaries.516 The only agents
affecting veteran salaries are the NFL teams themselves, as many
teams are withholding some of the 96% of the pie left for veterans
after rookies claim a miniscule 4% of the total cap space.517
4. The League Was Dragging Out Negotiations to Free Itself
from Antitrust Law
The League may have been dragging out negotiations in the
hope that it would receive a favorable decision in the American
Needle v. National Football League518 case, which could have
eliminated one of the Union’s negotiating tactics. Ownership had
an incentive to drag out negotiations in order to both pad its
lockout fund and potentially gain a tactical advantage in
negotiations. The League is already generating a steady stream of
revenues, with more already in place in the event of a strike or
lockout.519 Due to its growing pockets, the NFL can drag

511

Jeff Levine, All Signs Point to NFL Work Stoppage in 2011, BIZ OF FOOTBALL (Jan.
8, 2010), http://www.bizoffootball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=595:all-signs-point-to-nfl-work-stoppage-in-2011&catid=44:articles-and-opinion&
Itemid=61.
512
Goodell: Union Report Inaccurate, supra note 458.
513
Florio, Union Poses, supra note 459.
514
Id.
515
See Graziano, Crabtree Aside, supra note 470.
516
Florio, The Case Against, supra note 485.
517
Id.
518
130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
519
See, e.g., King, supra note 497.
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negotiations out for a significant period of time and never produce
the information the Union has requested.
If the NFL had successfully persuaded the Supreme Court that
it functioned as a single entity, the League would have become
exempt from antitrust scrutiny, thereby making antitrust law
inapplicable. If this occurred, the NFLPA would have been
foreclosed from decertifying and filing an antitrust lawsuit like it
did in 1993.520 This occurrence would have then only left the
Union with the option of using labor law to come to an agreement.
Luckily, the NFL was unable to convince the Supreme Court that
its teams operated as a single entity, in “complete unity of
interest”521 with objectives that are in common.522 Instead the
Court definitely ruled against providing the NFL any type of labor
exemption.523
If the NFL was dragging its feet in negotiations in order to see
if American Needle would provide it with an improved bargaining
position, the League’s conduct amounts to merely going through
the motions of bargaining with no intent to come to an agreement.
Thus, in this situation, the NFLPA may contend that the NFL and
its thirty-two teams are not bargaining in good faith.524
520

Jeff Levine, High Court to Hear NFL Antitrust Case, Could Lead to Huge Victory
for League, BIZ OF FOOTBALL (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.bizoffootball.com/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=461:high-court-to-hear-nfl-antitrustcase-could-lead-to-huge-victory-for-league&catid=34:nfl-news&Itemid=53.
521
Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593 (7th
Cir. 1996).
522
Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212.
523
The Court opined that the League’s teams “compete with one another, not only on
the playing field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial
and playing personnel” and specific to the American Needle case, “the teams compete in
the market for intellectual property.” See id. at 2212–13.
524
For the NFL, waiting to meaningfully negotiate with the Union until American
Needle was decided was worth risking a possible ULP filing because of the relatively
short career span of the average NFL player. See Dan Raley, New NFL Goal: A Longer
Life, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 9, 2008, http://www.seattlepi.com/football/
362412_nflhealth09.html (noting that the average career for an NFL player is three and a
half seasons). If the League was granted an antitrust exemption, it could have drastically
dragged out negotiations for years and decimated the PA’s membership. Similar to the
rationale of the NHL players who would not present a united front in exchange for
potentially sacrificing multiple seasons of hockey, if the average life of an NFL player is
around three and a half years, that player does not have the luxury of waiting out a
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VI. PREDICTIONS—LOCKOUT SEEMS IMMINENT
The rhetoric of both the NFL and NFLPA is intensifying.
Judging from the behavior of the parties, it appears that both sides
have no problem dealing with an uncapped 2010 season in
preparation of a prolonged labor stoppage.525 The pace of
negotiations has slowed.526 The NFL was content to take a waitand-see approach with American Needle and engage in real
negotiations only after the Supreme Court rendered its decision.
Even though the League did not receive a favorable ruling, the
NFLPA is convinced that Ownership will lock the players out.527
“Our players know the [L]eague has hired the guy [attorney Bob
Batterman] that engineered the NHL lockout,” Smith said. “They
look at these new TV contracts that guarantee payment even in the
event of a lockout.”528 Thus, Smith surmises, the NFL hopes to
implement a strategy similar to that engineered by Batterman
during the NHL lockout and wait for the NFLPA to break
solidarity all while relying on its guaranteed contracts from
sponsors such as DirecTV.529 The only difference with this labor
stoppage is that this time, the NFL hoped to avoid the possibility of
Union decertification and antitrust scrutiny through a favorable

lockout that could last multiple years in duration. NFL players are more likely to
acquiesce to Ownership’s demands in a long labor dispute because of their relatively
short playing career. This short playing career would make it difficult for the Union to
present a united front to the League, thereby giving the NFL the upper hand in
negotiating a management-friendly CBA.
525
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
526
Peter King recently wrote, “I hear progress is virtually nil and the players are
pessimistic that a new deal will get done in time for them to play the 2011 season.”
Cowboys Owner Jerry Jones Discusses NFL Economics on “FNIA,” STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 28, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
article/135834.
527
NFLPA Director Smith Convinced Players Will Be Locked Out in 2011, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 17, 2009, available at http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d
5d811f51d2&template=without-video-with-comments&confirm=true.
528
Dan Graziano, DeMaurice Smith: NFL Intent on Locking Out Players, NFL
FANHOUSE (June 15, 2009), http://nfl.fanhouse.com/2009/06/15/demaurice-smith-nflintent-on-locking-out-players.
529
See Futterman, supra note 411.
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American Needle decision.530 However, the NFL was unable to
convince the Supreme Court to grant such a tactical advantage.
Since the League cannot stand behind American Needle in
order to elude an antitrust challenge, the PA has begun to seek
authorization from the membership to decertify as a union if
necessary.531 Decertification of the union would immediately
allow the Players as individuals to challenge in court any action by
the Owners that alter the current labor system.532 Suing under
antitrust law would also allow the Players to seek treble damages
from the NFL. However, decertifying as a union could also have a
chilling effect on negotiations.533 It may also lead some to
characterize such a decision as a “sham” decertification534 intended
to circumvent the labor exemption to antitrust law. Although
decertification is still possible, Smith insists that his players want
to negotiate a new deal, starting with addressing the financials.535
However, in reality, financial disclosure is not going to occur as
the NFL is not alleging an inability to pay and is most likely not in
a hurry to negotiate a successor agreement.
Both sides do not seem greatly concerned about how the NHL
lockout did serious damage to the goodwill of professional hockey.
It is unclear whether the parties are truly ready to sacrifice labor
peace for the uncertainty of a prolonged labor conflict, especially
530

Liz Mullen, NFL Filing in American Needle Case Could Affect Labor Relations,
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.sportsbusiness
daily.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=sbd.main&ArticleID=134981.
531
Liz Mullen, Union Seeks Authority to Decertify, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS
J., Sept. 13, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/66916
[hereinafter Mullen, Union Seeks Authority].
532
Id.
533
See Daniel Kaplan, NFL’s Goodell Says NFLPA’s Move to Decertify Could Hamper
Labor Talks, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 13, 2010,
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=tdi.closingBell&utm_source=
cb_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=headlineslink&utm_campaign=cbemail.
534
Mullen, Union Seeks Authority, supra note 531.
535
“The players of the National Football League are still in the dark
about why this deal isn’t good enough,” Smith said. “And the easiest
way to demonstrate any problem with the deal is the way any
business in America demonstrates it: They turn over what the profit
or loss numbers are. And if there’s a problem with the model, we’ll
fix it.”
Brown & Prine, supra note 203.
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after the NHL’s recent disastrous labor dispute.
While
professional football enjoys more widespread popularity than the
NHL,536 it is reasonable to imagine that a protracted labor dispute
would similarly damage the profitability and popularity of the
NFL. The current compositions of the NFL and the Union are not
radically different from their respective predecessors. This
bargaining relationship is decades long and possesses an emotional
history checkered with heated conflicts.537 Given this past, one
struggles to understand why either side wants to reopen the bitter
feelings of the past by waiting till the expiration of the current
CBA. The current CBA was responsible for billions of dollars in
profits for both Owners and players alike,538 but this Agreement is
largely considered broken due to irreconcilable differences
between the parties. It remains to be seen whether an uncapped
and unfloored 2010 season will allow the parties to mend a
relationship that was relatively calm throughout the late 1990s
until mid-2008.539 However, labor peace, when one examines the
bargaining history of the parties, has been the exception rather than
the rule. Taking this into consideration, the authors expect the
NFL to initiate a lockout, signaling the beginning of a protracted
dispute that could be significant in duration.
An intense and long-lasting labor stoppage could also
significantly impact the other major U.S. sports. As one team
executive posits, “[i]f the NFL has substantial labor issues, there
will be a dramatic ripple effect—good and bad dependent on where
you sit—throughout the sports industry.”540 Thus, the events in the
coming year between the NFL and NFLPA will bear significant
consequences for virtually all of professional sports.

536
Curtis Eichelberger, NHL Borrows from NFL as It Pursues Bigger TV Contract
(Update 1), BLOOMBERG, May 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601109&sid=aGY7pu.INAhA.
537
See Goplerud, supra note 86, at 13–33.
538
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
539
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
540
The Sports Business Year That Was: A Look Back at ’09, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
index.cfm?fuseaction=sbd.all&ArticleID=135672 (citing Atlanta Braves Executive Vice
President, Derek Schiller).

